

THE INDONESIAN MILITARY IN IRIAN JAYA



A sub-thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the course of study for the degree of Master of Arts (Strategic Studies) in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

Submitted by  
Martin O'Hare  
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## STATEMENT

This sub-thesis is my own work and all sources used have been acknowledged.

*M.P.O'Hare*  
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(M.P.O'Hare)



CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Preface	v
1. Irian Jaya: An Introduction	1
The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces	1
Background to the Problem	5
2. The Military Organisation in Irian Jaya	17
Introduction	19
Army	24
Navy	28
Air Force	30
Police	31
Framework for Analysis of Military Activity	32
Summary	35
3. The Impact of the Military in Irian Jaya	50
Military Objectives in Irian Jaya	50
Implementation of Development Policies	60
Summary	68
4. Concluding Statement	79

## Bibliography

83

## Maps

- |  |    |
|--|----|
| 1. Indonesia                                   | vi |
| 2. Irian Jaya Province with Regency Boundaries | 22 |
| 3. Kodam V111/Trikora                          | 23 |

## Figures

- |   |    |
|---|----|
| 1. Military Area Command (Kodam) Headquarters       | 38 |
| 2. Military Sub-Area Command (Korem) Headquarters   | 39 |
| 3. Military District Command (Kodim) Headquarters   | 40 |
| 4. Military Sector Command (Koramil) Headquarters   | 41 |
| 5. Organisation of Territorial Infantry Battalions  | 42 |
| 6. Organisation of an Infantry Battalion (Brigaded) | 43 |

## PREFACE

This sub-thesis is an account of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) in Irian Jaya. It examines the pursuit by the military of internal security and development objectives and the consequences for the population of Irian Jaya.


Chapter 1 briefly looks at the broad roles of ABRI and their relevance to Irian Jaya. It provides an historical overview of the Indonesia-Dutch dispute over Irian Jaya and the arrival of ABRI in the province.

My aim in chapter 2 is to detail the organisation and strength of military forces in Irian Jaya. This analysis leads to conclusions about the role of the military in the province and provides a framework from which to analyse Indonesian military activity in Irian Jaya. Chapter 2 also sets out to ascertain whether ABRI has the military capability in Irian Jaya to threaten Papua New Guinea.

Chapter 3 examines the objectives of the military in Irian Jaya, how policies are implemented and the effect of policy implementation on the indigenous population. My aim is to find out how security is maintained in the province, the importance of development projects to military authorities and whether development projects take account of Irianese aspirations.

The final chapter provides a brief summary of the discussion and the repercussions for Papua New Guinea and Australia of ABRI's internal security and development roles in Irian Jaya.

I am grateful to Dr Leszek Buszynski for encouraging me to complete this work. His contribution to putting this sub-thesis together was essential. I am responsible for the translation of Indonesian texts and for any errors of fact or judgement. Finally, to the many people who assisted me along the way, I offer my sincere thanks.



Map 1. Indonesia



## 1. IRIAN JAYA: AN INTRODUCTION

### THE ROLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) is both a military force and a social-political force in Indonesian society.<sup>1</sup> As a military force, ABRI is responsible for the defence of Indonesia from internal and external threats. In the context of defending against internal threats, ABRI sees itself as the guarantor of Indonesian unity and stability as well as the guardian of the constitution and national philosophy, Pancasila.<sup>2</sup> In the social-political role, military appointees occupy positions in the public service and state-run institutions and enterprises, and fill one-fifth of the seats in the national and provincial parliaments. As a social-political force, ABRI assumes responsibility for motivating the population to achieve development goals as set out in the five-year development plans.

The military refers to its dual function in terms of its roles as a 'stabiliser' and 'dynamiser'.<sup>3</sup> As a stabiliser, the armed forces aims to provide a framework of unity and stability within which development can occur. As a dynamiser, the military endeavours to assist in the achievement of development goals.<sup>4</sup>

From the military's perspective, development (*pembangunan*) has both a physical and psychological dimension and thus encompasses

a range of factors including economic development, political development and development in the social and cultural fields.<sup>5</sup> For the military, development depends largely on the maintenance of internal stability, and internal stability is in turn related to the prosperity and welfare of the people. The interdependence between welfare and security means that development assumes a high degree of importance to military authorities. Any matter that hinders development is a threat to security.<sup>6</sup>

There is a view within the military that the Indonesian people are easily led, politically immature and require close supervision.<sup>7</sup> The close supervision of the population is manifested in, for example, the need to obtain approval for travel, meetings, sermons and publications.<sup>8</sup> As an example in the political sphere, all campaign speeches for the 1987 general election were scrutinised by a committee prior to public delivery to ensure consistency with Pancasila ethics.<sup>9</sup>

The security situation at any given time is described as *aman* (peaceful, secure), *rawan* (troubled, disturbed), *gawat* (serious), *kritis* (critical) and *bahaya* (dangerous).<sup>10</sup> Security is viewed as a spectrum encompassing ideological, political, economic, social-cultural and defence factors, in which a weakness in any one factor is seen as threatening the stability of the whole.<sup>11</sup>

This holistic or paranoic view of security serves to justify the expanded role of the military because almost anything can be seen as a threat to security. A violent crime, for instance, is not simply a matter for police investigation. It will attract close

scrutiny from military intelligence as it may have been committed to obtain funds for subversive activities or to discredit the government. A natural disaster, such as a flood or an earthquake, is a threat to security because its economic impact may make people restless and dissatisfied.

Anything that cannot be controlled or monitored closely is a potential threat to security. A western anthropologist in Irian Jaya, for instance, may highlight the backwardness of the people or show how traditional culture is being eroded by Indonesian values. In the former case, Indonesia could be accused of neglecting the Irianese and in the latter case, of cultural imperialism. The anthropologist may also encourage pan-Melanesian or separatist sentiments in the people. It follows, therefore, that if the anthropologist obtained permission to undertake research in Irian Jaya, his or her movements would be monitored closely by military intelligence. Similarly, an Irianese refugee returning to Irian Jaya from Papua New Guinea would be required to report regularly to military authorities until the authorities were assured that the individual concerned had adopted a mental outlook consistent with the national philosophy.<sup>12</sup> In the same vein, the considerable influence of tribal leaders and missionaries in Irian Jaya is accepted with reservation by military authorities in Irian Jaya. It is a sign that government control is yet to be accepted fully and thus an indication that development (in its comprehensive sense) is far from complete.<sup>13</sup>

What is the problem in Irian Jaya? Why is there an independence movement and why have many Irianese sought refuge in neighbouring



Papua New Guinea? The answer to these questions is partly related to the military's roles as a 'stabiliser' (maintainer of security) and 'dynamiser' (motivator of the population to achieve development goals).

The close control that the military exerts over society, its intolerance to opposition and readiness to employ excessive force to maintain security are matters that have adversely affected relations between the military and the people of Irian Jaya. Throughout Indonesia, there is little hesitation to employ force if, in the opinion of military commanders, security is threatened.<sup>14</sup> For the military, the necessity for tight control of the population is probably particularly important in Irian Jaya. The 'mental psychological' condition of the Irianese people is described as unstable and the Irianese are regarded as being easily misled by false promises whether from dishonest administrators or from dissident leaders.<sup>15</sup> The result is a tendency to act arbitrarily with relatively minor security incidents attracting a disproportionately harsh military response.<sup>16</sup> This reaction is not confined to Irian Jaya<sup>17</sup> and serves to underline the gulf between the idealism espoused in statements of 'sacrifice' in the interests of the people and 'the unity of ABRI and the people'.<sup>18</sup>

The second problem relates to the military's role of 'dynamiser' in the support of development programs. There is a belief that in order to achieve welfare goals and raise the economic prosperity of the people (and thereby improve security), there is a requirement to bring about a cultural transformation so that the

Irianese can accept development programs more readily.<sup>19</sup> Efforts on the part of the military to effect change according to its view of progress, as well as programs to enhance national integration like transmigration, have led to considerable dissatisfaction in the province.

#### BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

Irian Jaya (formerly Dutch New Guinea and West Irian) is a sparsely-inhabited, rugged, inhospitable land covered by dense jungle and swamp. The 421,981 square kilometres of Irian Jaya represents 22 per cent of Indonesia's total land mass.<sup>20</sup> The population is around 1,600,000 - less than one per cent of Indonesia's total population of 180 million. By contrast, Java with an area less than one third that of Irian Jaya has a population of over 100 million.<sup>21</sup> 85 per cent of the population is nominally Christian and the remaining 15 per cent Moslem. Nationally, Indonesia is predominantly Islamic, with 87 per cent of the population adherents of Islam.<sup>22</sup> Irian Jaya is also home to 240 of Indonesia's 558 separate languages<sup>23</sup>.

How did the military arrive in Irian Jaya and what significance is the province to Indonesia? As noted below, the incorporation of Irian Jaya into Indonesia represented the final chapter in Indonesia's struggle against Dutch colonialism. In the view of Indonesian nationalists, cultural, racial, religious, development or historical differences between Irian Jaya and other parts of Indonesia were of little significance. In Indonesia's view,

independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945 for the whole of the former Dutch East Indies, including Irian, and Indonesians struggled from 1945-49 to achieve independence for the whole of the archipelago. It seems inconceivable that Indonesia would ever allow Irian Jaya to become independent. For most Indonesians, this would be a betrayal of the struggle for independence and the first step in the disintegration of the national state.

The Dutch arrived in Java in 1596 and gradually extended their influence to other islands. In 1828, the Dutch established an ill-fated settlement near Triton Bay in north-west New Guinea and, in response to anticipated British intrusion, took possession of New Guinea to 141 degrees east longitude in the name of the Sultan of Tidore.<sup>24</sup> When the Netherlands eventually recognised the independence of Indonesia in 1949, the status of West Irian remained unresolved. The Netherlands and Indonesia agreed to maintain the *status quo* and resolve the political status of West Irian within one year. The Indonesian interpretation of this agreement was that West Irian would be incorporated into Indonesia after a year. The Dutch, however, interpreted the failure to reach a solution as providing for the continued maintenance of Dutch rule.<sup>25</sup>

The adverse conservative reaction to the dismemberment of its empire and a desire to provide an area for Eurasian colonisation were early factors in the Dutch decision to retain West Irian.<sup>26</sup> The Dutch argued that the surrender of West Irian to the Indonesians was contrary to the interests of the Irianese people. In the Dutch view, Indonesia was an underdeveloped country and



did not possess the capital or the trained manpower to develop its own territory let alone West Irian. Most West Irianese, the Dutch argued, had never heard of Indonesia and should be allowed to decide their own future.<sup>27</sup>

Most Indonesian writers of the time mention Tidore's claim over New Guinea and the Dutch recognition of that claim, but this historical tie was of minor importance.<sup>28</sup> The question of West Irian was viewed as having been resolved in the struggle for independence, 1945-49. Nationalists maintained that they had struggled for the independence of the whole archipelago, not just part of it.<sup>29</sup> Indonesia's case rested primarily on the successor-state claim: Irian Jaya had formed part of the Dutch East Indies and the claim of the nationalist movement was 'to succeed to Dutch rule over the whole of Netherlands India'.<sup>30</sup> Indonesia existed 'from Sabang to Merauke' and not from Sabang to Ambon.<sup>31</sup>

For generations, the Indonesians asserted, the Dutch interest in West Irian was to maintain a competitor-free buffer zone east of the lucrative spice islands. Their belated post-war concern about the rights of the Irianese people was colonialism under the guise of a *mission sacree*.<sup>32</sup> The question of cultural and racial differences was irrelevant to the Indonesians in view of the heterogeneous nature of Indonesia itself.<sup>33</sup> The argument of immaturity of the newly-independent Indonesia to govern West Irian effectively was also of little significance to the Indonesians. For Indonesia, it was a question of colonialism or independence.<sup>34</sup> While the Dutch held West Irian, the Indonesian

revolution was incomplete.<sup>35</sup> There was also an emotional attachment to West Irian that had been forged through the banishment of several prominent Indonesian nationalists to Tanah Merah on the Digul River from the late 1920s. Among these leaders was Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia's first Vice President.<sup>36</sup>

Self-determination for the people of West Irian was of little importance to the Indonesian nationalists. If the same concept was applied to other regions of Indonesia, it could mean the acceptance of the disintegration of the Indonesian national state.<sup>37</sup> In Indonesia's view, it was Dutch intransigence that prevented the handing over of West Irian in 1949. The issue was one of national unity, not one of self-determination for the West Irianese people.<sup>38</sup>

Indonesia initially attempted to gain sovereignty over West Irian by diplomatic means. When diplomatic efforts failed, Indonesia adopted a policy of economic and military pressure. Dutch enterprises were confiscated in 1957 but as economic measures failed to bring about a solution, Indonesia resolved to occupy West Irian by force. The Indonesian government built up the strength of its armed forces and sent missions abroad to purchase arms.<sup>39</sup>

The Dutch policy of self-determination for West Irian provoked a hostile response from Indonesia. In December 1961, in response to the organisation of the New Guinea Council<sup>40</sup> and the announcement of a Papuan flag and national anthem, President Sukarno proclaimed the *Trihora* or 'Three Commands of the People'

consisting of orders to 'prevent the formation of the Dutch colonial Puppet State of Papua, hoist the Indonesian flag in Irian and prepare a general mobilisation to defend Indonesia's independence and unity'.<sup>41</sup>

The *Mandala* Command under Major-General (later President) Suharto was given the task of planning and executing the military operation to prevent the formation of the 'Dutch puppet state' in West Irian. Over several months, some 2,000 troops in small contingents were air-dropped or infiltrated by sea into West Irian where they operated with very limited success.<sup>42</sup> Meanwhile, planning proceeded for Operation *Jayawijaya*, a major conventional assault to capture Biak.<sup>43</sup>

The New York Agreement in August 1962 meant that the Indonesian assault - perhaps fortunately for Indonesia<sup>44</sup> - did not eventuate. Under the Agreement, the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) formed an interim government from August 1962 until the transfer of administrative authority to the Indonesian government in May 1963.<sup>45</sup> During this period, a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) consisting of Pakistani troops and the Dutch-formed Papuan Police and Papuan Volunteer Corps was responsible for security. The Indonesian guerilla fighters previously landed in West Irian were gathered together at several locations and unified under the name *Kotindo* or Indonesian Contingents. They were placed at the disposal of the United Nations to maintain law and order but in practice remained under the command of the Indonesian commander.<sup>46</sup>



After the transfer of administration to Indonesia, the Indonesian Contingents were further augmented by staff and formed units. This formed the basis of the Seventeenth Military Area Command or Kodam XV11/Irian Barat. In 1964, the name of the Kodam was changed to Kodam XV11/Cenderawasih and the motto *Praja Ghupta Vira* was conferred. Somewhat ironically, in view of later events, the motto means 'soldiers are the protectors of the people'.

The New York Agreement also stipulated that the people of West Irian were to be given the choice of whether or not to remain with Indonesia. In 1969, a little over 1,000 representatives of the people expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia in the Act of Free Choice, an act described by one observer as an exercise in 'persuasion, intimidation and violence'.<sup>47</sup> Given that President Suharto had stated a few months before the Act that any decision by the people of West Irian to leave the Republic of Indonesia would be regarded as treason, the result was never in doubt.<sup>48</sup> From the Indonesian viewpoint, the requirement under the 1962 Agreement for an act of self-determination to be held before the end of 1969 was regarded as a denial of Indonesia's claim that West Irian was an integral part of Indonesia. In Indonesia's view, the Irianese population had exercised its right of self-determination in the August 1945 declaration of independence.<sup>49</sup> In any case, international opinion was prepared to accept the Act as a *fait accompli* despite its obvious shortcomings.<sup>50</sup>

In 1973, the province was renamed Irian Jaya. In 1985, as a result of a major reorganisation of the Army's structure, the Kodam was renamed Kodam VI11/Trikora and became responsible for



the Moluccas as well as Irian Jaya. The birthday of Kodam VIll is celebrated (at least in military circles) on 1 August.<sup>51</sup>

## Notes to Chapter 1:

1. The expansion of the Army's non-military role in the 1950s and 1960s was accompanied by a military doctrine formulated in 1965 and 1966 to justify and legitimise the expanded role. The doctrine is referred to as *Dwi Fungsi* (Dual Function). See Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New York, 1978, pp.344-5. See also L.D. Watson, 'The Doctrine of Dwi Fungsi in the Indonesian Armed Forces', *Journal of the Australian Naval Institute*, February 1978.
2. The Pancasila are the five principles - belief in God, humanitarianism, national consciousness, popular sovereignty, and social justice - formulated by Sukarno in 1945 and later accepted as the national ideology.
3. See, for example, President Suharto's speech at the opening the high-level annual meeting of ABRI leaders, 1-3 November 1990, *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, (Armed Forces Daily), 6 November 1990, p.1. See also Harold Crouch, *op. cit.*, pp.246, 251, 273; David Jenkins, *Suharto and his Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 1984, p.66.
4. 'ABRI judges its own success by two measures - security and development'. See Harold W. Maynard, 'The Role of the Indonesian Armed Forces', Edward Olsen and Stephen Jurika (eds), *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies*, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1986, p.212.
5. A. Ismail et al., *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, (A Chronology of West Irian), Sejarah Militer Kodam XV11/Cenderawasih, 1971, pp.xvii-xviii.
6. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 2 February 1989, p.X; 13 February 1989, p.X.
7. For example, and in a different context, following large-scale military operations against dissidents of the Free Aceh Movement, the Kodam commander in Aceh stated the security situation in Aceh had stabilised: 'Disturbances to the peace by a handful of criminals have been overcome and therefore the people need not worry any more'. See *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 3 October 1990, p.V11.
8. Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, Fontana/Collins, 1980, p.94. The requirement for a foreigner to 'report' (*lapor*), obtain stamps and so forth is highlighted in George Monbiot, *Poisoned Arrows*, Michael Joseph, London, 1989, pp.26, 56, 156, 169, 187, 197.
9. 'All campaign speeches screened before delivery', *Jakarta Post*, 21 August 1986. Contesting parties were not allowed to cast aspersions on the government, government officials, religious groups, organisations, foreign governments and individuals.
10. Seskoad, *Vademecum: Pengetahuan Pertahanan Keamanan*, (Handbook of Knowledge on Defence and Security), second edition,

1982, p.330.

11. The matters considered in military appreciations are referred to as *Ipoleksosbudhankam*, an acronym based on the Indonesian words for ideology, politics, economics, socio-cultural, and defence and security. Crouch, *op. cit.*, pp.25, 345, refers to the earlier variant *Ipoleksosbudag*, which excludes defence and security but includes religion. See also Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p.3.

12. Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985, pp.54, 170.

13. Lieutenant-General Kahpi Suriadireja, 'Pengembangan Irian Jaya ditinjau dari segi ketahanan nasional' (Development in Irian Jaya from the viewpoint of national resilience), Manuel Kasiepo et al. (eds), *Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedalaman Irian Jaya*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1987, pp.51, 63; *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 20 July 1989, p.X; 'Tokoh agama punya tugas berat' (Religious leaders have a heavy responsibility), *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 26 September 1990.

14. The commander of Kodam VI (Kalimantan) stated the military would not hesitate to use force in circumstances where security was threatened. See *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 13 February 1989, p.X.

15. Lieutenant-General Kahpi Suriadireja, 'Berbagai Permasalahan di Irian Jaya', (Problems in Irian Jaya), *Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Teknologi*, 2, Jakarta, 1985, pp.3, 5, 8. See also Major-General Abinowo's statement in *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 14 February 1988, p.X.

16. Monbiot, *op. cit.*, pp.167, 176, 194. Benedict Anderson's treatment of traditional power in Java raises issues that are relevant to the military's security perceptions, namely that natural disasters and anti-social behaviour are interpreted as symptoms of a ruler's declining authority and that the slightest lack of vigilance on the part of the ruler may begin the process of disintegration. See Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1972.

17. The severe treatment of Javanese and Sundanese in military operations in Java in 1968-69 is a case in point. See Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1978, pp.200-14. More recently, in Central Java, the military pressured farmers to vacate their land, accept low financial compensation or transmigrate due to the construction of the Kedung Ombo dam. See 'Javanese peasants pay the price of progress', *Canberra Times*, 2 March 1991, p.B4.

18. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 1 September 1990, p.1; 29 September 1990, p.V11; 5 October 1990, p.1V; Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967*, Oxford University Press, Selangor, 1982, pp.191; Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p.95.

19. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 22 October 1990, p.V11.



20. Biro Pusat Statistik, *Statistik Indonesia, Statistical Year Book of Indonesia 1987*, Jakarta, 1988, p.48.
21. *ibid.*, pp.44-5, 47, 49. The population of Irian Jaya in the 1990 census was 1,629,087, of whom 1,233,956 lived in rural areas. The growth rate was 3.9 per cent. See Biro Pusat Statistik, *Population of Indonesia: Results of the 1990 Census*, Jakarta, January 1991.
22. *Statistik Indonesia, op. cit.*, pp.117, 172.
23. Peter J. Silzer and Helja Heikkinen, 'Index of Irian Jaya Languages', *Irian: Bulletin of Irian Jaya*, Volume X11, 1984, p.1.
24. Robert C. Bone, *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem*, Cornell University, New York, 1958, pp.16-21.
25. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 1985, p.301. For a discussion of the rival Indonesian and Dutch claims, see Bone, *op. cit.*; William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement*, Seton Hall University Press, 1973, pp.26-47; Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp.394-5.
26. Henderson *op. cit.*, pp.38-9; Justus M. van der Kroef, 'The West New Guinea Dispute', Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958, pp.3, 5, 6, 14-5; Paul W. van der Veur, *West New Guinea: Irian Barat of (sic) Papua Barat?*, An address to the New Guinea Society, Canberra, 27 September 1962, p.1.
27. E. Katoppo, *Perdjoangkan Irian Kembali Kedalam Wilayah Indonesia*, (Fight for Irian's Return to Indonesia), Kilat Madju, Bandung, 1955, pp.64-5, 68, 76; van der Kroef, *The West New Guinea Dispute, op. cit.*, pp.11-12.
28. Katoppo, *op. cit.*, pp.77-85.
29. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Question of West Irian in the United Nations 1954-1957*, Jakarta, 1958, pp.379-381.
30. Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp.26-7, 46; Tapol, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, London, 1983, p.17.
31. Katoppo, *op. cit.*, p.13; van der Kroef, *The West New Guinea Dispute, op. cit.*, pp.1, 11; Nazaruddin Lubis, *Irian Barat*, Gotong Rojong, Jakarta, 1962, p.114.
32. Dutch New Guinea remained generally free from western influence until late in the nineteenth century. The first Christian missionary, a Jesuit priest, established a mission station at Fakfak on the Onin Peninsula in 1884. There was no permanent Dutch presence in New Guinea until 1898 when administrative posts were established at Fakfak and Sorong (P. Ryan (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea*, vol 1, Melbourne University Press, 1972, pp.279, 282). Government contact with much of the interior of New Guinea is a comparatively recent occurrence. The first Dutch government post in the Baliem Valley was established at Wamena in 1956, two years

after Christian missionaries entered the valley (Larry L. Naylor, *Culture Change and Development in the Balim Valley*, Ph.D. thesis, Southern Illinois University of Carbonvale, 1974, p.145). The Kamu Valley in the Lake Paniai area was not pacified by the Dutch until 1956 (Leopold Pospisil, *The Kapauku Papuans of West New Guinea*, second edition, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1977, pp.97, 108-9). The Jalemo area in the eastern Star Mountains had no contact with missionaries or government patrols until 1961 (Klaus-Friedrich Koch, *Peace and War in Jalemo*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974, p.3). In its report to the United Nations in 1954, the Dutch administration estimated that 300,000 out of the Dutch New Guinea's then indigenous population of 700,000 were still in a completely primitive state and not administered by Dutch authority. In 1957, a Dutch spokesman reported to the UN General Assembly that 'only approximately half (the) population has ever had contact with someone outside their own tribe' (Bone, *op. cit.*, pp.6, 149). At the time, the total length of roads was under 300 miles due to the sparseness of population and the high cost of establishing infrastructure (Charles A. Fisher, *South-east Asia: A Social, Economic and Political Geography*, second edition, Methuen, London, 1966, p.396).

33. van der Kroef, *The West New Guinea Dispute*, *op. cit.*, p.9.

34. Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, *The Future of West Irian*, Diplomatic Press and Publishing Company, London, 1950, p.2.

35. Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

36. A. Hasjmy, *Tanah Merah*, Bulan Bintang, Jakarta, 1976, *passim*.

37. Henderson, *op. cit.*, p.27.

38. Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, Malmsbury, 1977, p.41.

39. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.23.

40. Kees Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1979, pp.64, 106; Tapol, *op. cit.*, p.20.

41. E. Soewandha Natanegara (ed.), *Api Perjuangan Pembebasan Irian Barat*, (The Struggle for the Freedom of West Irian), Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, Jakarta, 1986, p.142.

42. Suryatno Hadinoto, *25 Tahun Trikora*, (25 Years of the People's Three Commands), Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, Jakarta, 1988, p.192. According to this account, 1,395 guerillas were infiltrated into West Irian of whom 214 died. Captain Benny Moerdani, later to become Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister for Defence and Security, commanded 160 troops that parachuted into Merauke. Robin Osborne notes 'Of the 1,419 troops dropped on New Guinea, 216 were killed or never found and 296 were captured'. See R.J. May (ed.), *Between Two Nations*, Robert Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1986, p.52.

43. *Jayawijaya* was an ambitious, divisional-level joint operation of amphibious assaults and parachute landings targeted on the main Dutch base in Biak. The intermediate objectives were Sorong, Fakfak and Kaimana and plans were formulated to capture Jayapura. See Ismail, *op. cit.*, pp.50-65; E. Soewandha Natanegara, *op. cit.*, pp.144-194; Suryatno Hadinoto, *op. cit.*, pp.73, 142-3, 177-9.
44. See Lagerberg, *op. cit.*, pp.83-4 and Ian MacFarling, 'Military Aspects of the West New Guinea Dispute, 1958-1962', SDSC Working Paper 212, ANU, 1990.
45. Tapol, *op. cit.*, p.21.
46. The function of the UNSF is described in Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp.214, 216.
47. Brian May, *op. cit.*, pp.163-199. See also Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia Since Sukarno*, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1971, pp.134-143 and Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp.226-240. For the Indonesian version see Minister of Home Affairs, *West Irian: Implementation of the Act of Free Choice*, Department of Information, Jakarta, 1969 and E. Soewandha Natanegara, *op. cit.*, pp.313-383.
48. Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia Since Sukarno*, *op. cit.*, p.136; Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.168.
49. Henderson, *op. cit.*, p.226, 233; Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.195.
50. Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp.236, 239-40; Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.169-170; Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp.22, 42.
51. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 1 August 1990, p.V11.



## 2. THE MILITARY ORGANISATION IN IRIAN JAYA

This chapter explains that the numerical strength of the Indonesian Armed Forces in Irian Jaya is comparatively small and that military units in Irian Jaya are organised and dispersed to cope with internal security and nation-building tasks. Army units in the province are mainly locally-raised territorial units with a limited capability to conduct conventional warfare. The Navy and Air Force are virtually absent from the province. It is clear that the military in Irian Jaya is concerned with internal security and development programs rather than with external aggression.

The number of Indonesian military personnel (including police) in Irian Jaya is around 10,000. Many reports erroneously put the number of troops in Irian Jaya at far higher levels.<sup>1</sup> The tendency to overestimate the number of troops is understandable due to the many accounts of Indonesian military operations in Irian Jaya and clashes between military and dissident groups. Moreover, since Indonesia took control of the province in 1963, a large number of Irianese have sought refuge in neighbouring Papua New Guinea. Many of these people fled their homes because they were frightened of the military or fearful of becoming involved in military operations directed against dissident elements. The frequent accounts of separatist activity and military operations



in Irian Jaya add to the impression of a large military presence in the province.

The expectation that Indonesia has large numbers of troops in Irian Jaya is fuelled by a belief in some quarters that Indonesia has expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea.<sup>2</sup> The view of an expansionist Indonesia is no more stronger than in Papua New Guinea.<sup>3</sup> As a corollary, it is easy to credit the Indonesian Armed Forces in Irian Jaya with the capability to invade Papua New Guinea, should there be sufficient reason to do so.<sup>4</sup> The reality is that the armed forces in the province are relatively thin on the ground and are organised to deal with internal threats rather than to mount external ventures. Without substantial reinforcements, Indonesia's military forces in Irian Jaya do not represent a threat to Papua New Guinea.

The picture of the strength and organisation of the military in Irian Jaya is clouded by contradictory claims regarding security in the province. On the one hand, Indonesian spokesmen claim that separatist elements do not exist or are an irrelevance whilst, on the other hand, separatist leaders claim an armed following of tens of thousands. Neither claim can be accepted at face value.

The number of military personnel in Irian Jaya provides an indication that armed rebellion in the province is not of the same magnitude as that faced in East Timor. In the mid-1970s, for example, Indonesia deployed around 30,000 troops to East Timor<sup>5</sup> to combat armed insurrection and today maintains relatively large numbers of combat troops in East Timor. This is not to say that

there is little or no opposition to the Indonesian government in Irian Jaya. Rather, as will be seen in chapter 3, the generally negative impact of the military on the people of Irian Jaya appears to be out of proportion to its numerical strength.

Based on the organisational framework of the military in Irian Jaya outlined in this chapter, it is possible to make tentative, but relatively informed, judgements concerning some of the reports of Indonesian military activities and operations in Irian Jaya. Some such judgements are made towards the end of this chapter.

## INTRODUCTION

The organisation of the military in Irian Jaya may be more easily comprehended with some introductory remarks about the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and the administrative entities that comprise the civil government in Indonesia.

ABRI consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police. Together, the four services have a strength of about 480,000 personnel.<sup>6</sup> The Army, with around 215,000 personnel,<sup>7</sup> is the senior service in terms of numerical strength and influence. The Indonesian Army is predominantly an infantry force of around 80 infantry battalions consisting of **three** primary commands.<sup>8</sup>

The Army Strategic Reserve Command (**Kostrad**) is the conventional military force responsible for the defence of Indonesia.

Kostrad's organisation is based on platoons (with a personnel strength of about 35), companies (150) and battalions (700).<sup>9</sup> An infantry battalion from Kostrad consists of three rifle companies (each of which has three platoons), a support company and a headquarters company. The support and headquarters companies provide the battalion's integral fire support and logistic support. A brigade contains three battalions and has a numerical strength of around 3,000 whilst a division normally contains three brigades and numbers around 10,000.<sup>10</sup>

Kostrad has two divisions each containing airborne and infantry brigades with integrated combat (armour, artillery and engineer units) and service support (such as transport, workshop, and supply units). One of Kostrad's airborne brigades, with dedicated naval and air support, maintains a high state of readiness for short notice deployments. With the exception of one brigade in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi, Kostrad is based on Java. However, from references to troops with 'green berets' operating in Irian Jaya, it is clear that Kostrad battalions or companies are assigned to Irian Jaya from time to time for specified tasks or tours of operation.<sup>11</sup>

The Special Forces Command (**Kopassus**) is also based on Java and consists of around 4,000 personnel comprising two special force groups, a counter-terrorist detachment plus integrated combat, service and training units. Special force soldiers receive training in commando, amphibious and airborne operations but also operate in standard infantry roles in company-size units.<sup>12</sup> They wear the red beret and are the successor organisation to




*Kopassandha*. Special force troops often operate in small teams and, from the numerous references to paracommandos and 'red berets' (invariably associated with brutality), are no strangers to service in Irian Jaya.<sup>13</sup>


63 of the Army's 80 battalions are allocated to the 10 military area commands, known as **Kodam**.<sup>14</sup> Units under Kodam control are generally not as well trained or equipped as units from Kostrad or Kopassus. The Kodams are responsible for 'territorial development' which encompasses anything from internal security duties to training the population to defend the nation. The battalions assigned to the Kodams are referred to as territorial battalions. These battalions have four rifle companies but no support company. This is an indication that their task is one of internal security and territorial development rather than conventional warfare. It also reflects the dispersal of the companies within the battalion's geographic area of operations. The integral fire support provided by a support company is not required if the battalion is not concentrated.

As far as I can ascertain, there are no Kostrad units or Kopassus troops based *permanently* in Irian Jaya.<sup>15</sup> The military's organisation and presence in Irian Jaya is thus based on the Army's Kodam or territorial structure, a network common to all provinces of Indonesia.

The territorial structure extends from the military area command (*Kodam*) to military sub-area commands (*Korem*) and thence to military district commands (*Kodim*) and military sub-district



Map 2. Irian Jaya Province with Regency (Kabupaten) Boundaries



Map 3. Kodam VIII/Trikora

commands (*Koramil*). The lowest level of contact and control is the village management NCO (*Babinsa*) who is allocated a number of villages and reports to a military sub-district command.<sup>16</sup> The organisations of a Kodam, Korem, Kodim and Koramil are shown in Figures 1-4.<sup>17</sup>

The civil administration in Indonesia flows from the national government to 27 provincial governments. The provincial governments administer the provinces through a number of regencies (*kabupaten*) which are further sub-divided into a number of sub-districts (*kecamatan*). Sub-district heads report to regents who in turn are responsible to the provincial governor. Irian Jaya is divided into nine regencies which are further divided into 121 sub-districts.<sup>18</sup> The regency boundaries in Irian Jaya are shown in Map 2. As described below, the military's territorial organisation in Irian Jaya is based on these civil boundaries.

## ARMY

The Eighth Military Area Command (Kodam Vlll) is responsible for Irian Jaya and Maluku (See Map 3). Its commander, a major-general, has his headquarters in Jayapura and commands the military and police assets in the two provinces. Kodam Vlll consists of four Korems (three of which are located in Irian Jaya), 14 Kodims (nine in Irian Jaya) and seven battalions (four in Irian Jaya).



The Army units in Kodam V111 are as follows:<sup>19</sup>

**Kodam V111/Trikora**

Kodim 1701 (Independent)  
733 infantry battalion  
one out-of-area battalion  
5 combat engineer detachment  
10 combat engineer detachment  
Infantry training schools

Jayapura  
Jayapura  
Ambon (mobile battalion)  
location & status unknown  
Ambon  
Waena (Jayapura)  
Ifargunung (Jayapura) and  
Suli (Ambon)

**Korem 171/Praja Vira Tana**

Kodim 1703  
Kodim 1704  
Kodim 1706  
HQ 752 infantry battalion

Manokwari  
Manokwari  
Sorong  
Fakfak  
Sorong

**Korem 172/Praja Vira Yakti**

Kodim 1702  
Kodim 1707  
HQ 751 infantry battalion

Abepura (Jayapura)  
Wamena  
Merauke  
Sentani (Jayapura)

**Korem 173/Praja Vira Braja**

Kodim 1705  
Kodim 1708  
Kodim 1709  
HQ 753 infantry battalion

Biak  
Nabire  
Biak  
Serui  
Nabire

**Korem 174/Pattimura**

Kodim 1501  
Kodim 1502  
Kodim 1503  
Kodim 1504  
Kodim 1505  
HQ 731 infantry battalion  
HQ 732 infantry battalion

Ambon  
Ternate  
Masohi  
Tual  
Ambon  
Namlea  
Masohi  
Ternate

The headquarters of the four Korems in Kodam V111 are located at Manokwari, Abepura (Jayapura) and Biak in Irian Jaya, and Ambon in Maluku (See Map 3). Each of the three Korems in Irian Jaya is responsible for three regencies. Korem 171 in Manokwari, for example, commands the Army assets in the regencies of Manokwari, Sorong, and Fakfak in the north-west of the province. The Korems are commanded by colonels.

Each of the three Korems in Irian Jaya is sub-divided into three

Kodims. The Kodim boundaries correspond to the civil regency boundaries. The geographical boundaries of the three Kodims in Korem 171, for example, correspond to the boundaries of Sorong, Manokwari and Fakfak regencies as shown in Map 2. The headquarters of Kodim 1703, Kodim 1704 and Kodim 1706 are located in the regency capitals at Manokwari, Sorong and Fakfak respectively. Kodims are commanded by lieutenant-colonels.

The number of Koramils per Kodim is related to the number of sub-districts within each regency. For example, Merauke regency with 18 sub-districts could be expected to have 18 Koramils.<sup>20</sup>

The territorial organisation in Irian Jaya can be pictured as follows:

	<b>commanded by:</b>	<b>consists of:</b>
Kodam	major general	2 provinces
Korem	colonel	3 regencies
Kodim	lieutenant colonel	1 regency
Koramil	junior officer	1 sub-district

There are seven infantry battalions in Kodam VI11, four based in Irian Jaya and three in Maluku. Of the four battalions in Irian Jaya, three are permanently based in Irian Jaya whilst the fourth battalion is assigned for a few years from another Kodam or from one of Kostrad's brigades. Of the three battalions in Maluku, one is the Kodam's ready reaction force and as such receives priority in training, personnel and equipment.<sup>21</sup>

Each of the three Korems in Irian Jaya has been allotted one battalion: 752 battalion to Korem 171, 751 battalion to Korem 172 and 753 battalion to Korem 173. Korem 174 in Maluku commands two

battalions.<sup>22</sup> These five infantry battalions are described as 'dispersed' territorial infantry battalions because their companies are dispersed within the boundaries of the Korem. For example, the companies of 751 battalion under command of Korem 172 in Jayapura, are dispersed within Kodim 1701 (Jayapura), Kodim 1702 (Wamena) and Kodim 1707 (Merauke) along the 750 kilometre border with Papua New Guinea. One of the companies of 751 battalion is located permanently in Merauke.<sup>23</sup> This company is allocated platoon, section or sub-section tasks within the Koramils of Kodim 1707 (Merauke).<sup>24</sup> In theory, the company is under command of 751 battalion in Jayapura but in practice its activities are coordinated largely by the Kodim commander in Merauke.<sup>25</sup>

The three territorial battalions in Irian Jaya are manned by Irianese troops but most officers are from outside the province. In 1988, for example, 85 percent of the personnel in 752 battalion at Sorong were Irianese.<sup>26</sup> The territorial battalions rarely, if ever, exercise as a battalion and cannot be considered as possessing the combat power or cohesion of a Kostrad battalion.

At any given time a fourth, non-Irianese, battalion is assigned to Irian Jaya for a few years before being rotated with another out-of-area battalion.<sup>27</sup> This battalion could be a territorial battalion from another Kodam or a battalion from one of the brigades of Kostrad.<sup>28</sup> The command status, location and identification of the out-of-area battalion is difficult to determine. From the scanty details available, it appears that the



out-of-area battalion is rotated within Korem 172 in Jayapura regency during its presumed 2-3 year tenure in Irian Jaya. It is not known how long an out-of-area battalion will continue to be assigned to Irian Jaya, whether future out-of-area battalions will be located in Korem 172, or whether the out-of-area battalion is commanded by a Korem or Kodam V111.

The Kodam commander has one infantry battalion earmarked as his regional ready reaction force. This battalion is described as a 'centralised' territorial infantry battalion as its sub-units or companies are co-located. Within Kodam V111, the mobile, para-trained 733 battalion in Ambon performs this task providing the initial reserve to deal with situations beyond the capability of the 'dispersed' territorial battalions. Figures 5 and 6 show the organisations of battalions based in Irian Jaya.<sup>29</sup>

As noted above, additional forces are assigned to Irian Jaya for the conduct of special operations. Such forces are likely to include elements from Kostrad or Kopassus.

Exclusive of any additional forces, I estimate that the number of Army personnel in Irian Jaya is in the order of 5,000.<sup>30</sup>

#### NAVY

The Indonesian Navy's Western Fleet operates out of Jakarta, its Eastern Fleet out of Surabaya. The Navy has no major ships stationed permanently in Irian Jaya. The largest naval base



within Kodam Vlll is at Ambon. The Ambon base is classified as a primary naval base (*Lantamal*) and reports to Eastern Fleet headquarters in Surabaya. The primary naval base in Ambon is commanded by a naval colonel.

The waters around southern Irian Jaya and the Aru Islands are rich in fish, prawns and squid. One of the Navy's main tasks is to ensure foreign fishing vessels are licensed to fish in Indonesian waters. In the decade between 1979 and 1988, 98 foreign (mainly Taiwanese) fishing vessels were apprehended in east Indonesian waters.<sup>31</sup> Other naval responsibilities include the prevention of smuggling and fishing using explosives and poisons.<sup>32</sup> The commander of primary naval base Ambon is responsible for search and rescue and commands a small maritime security task force assisted by light reconnaissance aircraft to maintain security at sea.<sup>33</sup> Ambon also assists larger security or combat task forces from Surabaya which periodically stage through its area of responsibility. The Kodam commander is advised of naval activities in the area through a Navy liaison officer (a colonel) on the Kodam headquarters.

Naval depots or stations (*Sional*) are located at Jayapura, Sorong and Biak in Irian Jaya, and Tual in the Kai Islands of south-east Maluku.<sup>34</sup> Naval support and repair facilities are also located in Manokwari and Merauke.<sup>35</sup> The naval stations report to Ambon and are commanded by Navy lieutenant-colonels.<sup>36</sup> They command a small support staff and are responsible for the maintenance of their modest facility, the reception of visiting ships and minor off-shore maritime security duties.

**AIR FORCE**

Kodam Vlll forms part of the Air Force's Operational Command 11 (headquartered in Ujung Pandang) which is responsible for eastern Indonesia.<sup>37</sup> As almost all of Indonesia's Air Force assets are located on Java, Irian Jaya is of little significance in terms of air power. There are no fighter-bomber aircraft stationed permanently in the province although fighter or interceptor aircraft stationed on Java exercise in the area.<sup>38</sup> For example, the deployment and use of OV-10 counter-insurgency aircraft against villages in Irian Jaya is well documented.<sup>39</sup>

The Air Force assets in the province - comprising three Puma helicopters and a Cessna aircraft<sup>40</sup> - are supplemented by civilian or missionary aircraft. Missionary aircraft play a major role in the movement of supplies and personnel, including assistance to the civil and military authorities in Irian Jaya.<sup>41</sup> Missionary aircraft are sometimes hired to rotate military personnel in isolated posts.<sup>42</sup>

The main Air Force bases in Irian Jaya are located at Sentani near Jayapura and Manuhua at Biak. Merauke is another airbase of some importance. These airbases are commanded by Air Force lieutenant-colonels assisted by a small number of support and base protection staff.<sup>43</sup> Pattimura airfield at Ambon is a commercial airfield useful as a stopover location between Java and Jayapura or Biak. A regular C-130 (Hercules aircraft) courier service operates into Irian Jaya for logistic support and occasional civic action tasks. The Kodam commander is informed of

air movements through an Air Force liaison officer (a colonel) on the Kodam headquarters.

## POLICE

The police in Indonesia have the usual range of responsibilities of western police forces. They are responsible for law and order, investigations and traffic control whilst specialists receive training in riot control. Both Irian Jaya and Maluku province form police areas (*Polda*) commanded by an area police chief of colonel rank. The area police chiefs are located in Jayapura and Ambon and command the police assets in their respective provinces from a headquarters similar in size to that of a Korem commander's. At these police headquarters, police majors or lieutenant-colonels command directorates responsible for security and intelligence, criminal investigation, crime prevention, riot control, traffic, personnel and logistics.

There are nine police sub-areas (*Polres*) in Irian Jaya corresponding to the nine regencies in the province. Police sub-areas are commanded by lieutenant-colonels and are in turn divided into police sectors (*Polsek*) commanded by junior officers. The 121 police sectors in Irian Jaya correspond with the number of sub-districts in the province.<sup>44</sup> The police sub-area and sector headquarters are located in the various regency and sub-district capitals.

In Maluku province, there are four sub-areas located in the four



regencies of the province and 55 police sectors located in the sub-districts of the regencies.<sup>45</sup> The police sector of Tobelo in the North Maluku sub-area, for example, is responsible for 30 villages, 32 islands and 37,000 people. Additionally, there is a police maritime patrol unit with several patrol boats and a police training school in Ambon. The school trains non-commissioned officers from Irian Jaya and other provinces, as well as civil security personnel.<sup>46</sup> Given around 20 police per police sector,<sup>47</sup> the number of police in Maluku province is unlikely to exceed 2,000 personnel.

Similarly, the number of police in Irian Jaya, taking into account training units such as the police school in Jayapura and elements of police mobile brigades located in the province, is probably in the order of 3,500.<sup>48</sup>

#### **FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY**

The above organisation and structure of Indonesia's armed forces in Irian Jaya can provide a framework from which to evaluate reports of Indonesian military activity in the province (or across the border in Papua New Guinea). This framework, combined with some knowledge of military procedures (such as the fact that general elections invariably herald an increased military presence and activity),<sup>49</sup> can assist in formulating tentative judgements concerning reported military activity in Irian Jaya.

For example, it was reported that 700 Indonesian troops were



deployed to the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border in 1978<sup>50</sup> and that 150 Indonesian troops crossed the border into Papua New Guinea in 1984.<sup>51</sup> Leaving aside the question of the reliability of this information, these reports are credible at first glance based purely on the fact that Indonesian companies are 150 strong, Indonesian battalions are 700 strong, and company or battalion-size units are likely to be allocated operational tasks along the border. For internal security operations on the border, however, it is most likely that the companies of a battalion would operate relatively independently. In other words, it would be unlikely that the rifle companies of the battalion would be concentrated in one location.

As a second example, it was reported in 1984 that 53 Indonesian soldiers destroyed crops and garden huts at Suwampa in Papua New Guinea. Indonesia denied the incursion claiming that the offenders were OPM guerillas in Indonesian Army uniforms.<sup>52</sup> Where did the offenders come from? As all but three of the troops involved were reportedly non-Melanesians, it is difficult to credit the Indonesian claim. Indonesian soldiers from 751 battalion in Korem 172 where the incident occurred are predominantly Melanesian, so it is most unlikely that soldiers from this territorial battalion were involved. Moreover, many Melanesian soldiers from 751 battalion had earlier deserted and crossed into Papua New Guinea following disturbances in Jayapura.<sup>53</sup> It is even less likely, therefore, that troops from this same unit would be involved in a cross-border operation. The soldiers who razed Suwampa may have come from the out-of-area battalion based in Irian Jaya. More likely, however, they were

Kostrad or Kopassus troops sent to Irian Jaya for security operations associated with the upsurge of dissident activity in Irian Jaya in 1983 and the planned uprising by West Papuan independence supporters in February 1984.<sup>54</sup> The odd number of soldiers involved (53 soldiers or platoon plus strength) provides an indication of the involvement of special force troops (Kopassus). Soldiers from Kopassus are the most likely troops to form 'task forces' tailored to a specific mission.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, as Kopassus soldiers appear to be deployed to Irian Jaya in 100-man companies,<sup>56</sup> 50 non-Melanesian troops neatly comprise one half of a special force company.

Third, based on the organisation of Korem 174 in Ambon (see p.25), a report that 'four battalions of paratroops and two of marines had been brought in (to Irian Jaya in 1977) from the military complex at Ambon'<sup>57</sup> appears dubious. 733 battalion in Ambon, the mobile battalion of Kodam Vlll, is the only para-trained battalion permanently located in Maluku province (of which Ambon is the capital). The two other battalions in Maluku, 731 and 732 battalions, are territorial battalions. These two battalions are dispersed throughout Korem 174 and are unlikely to be para-trained. But even if they were para-trained, it is doubtful that all the troops in Maluku would be sent to Irian Jaya simultaneously. Other queries arise: why *four* para-trained battalions, given that three battalions usually form an airborne brigade? And why *marine* battalions? It is possible that four battalions of paratroops from Kostrad and two marine battalions staged through Ambon (the main naval base within Kodam Vlll) from Java, Sulawesi or previous deployment in East Timor en route to



Irian Jaya, although the deployment of this number of troops would be unusual.

As a final example, reports that 5,000, 10,000 or 15,000 Indonesian troops (presumably brought in from outside the province) were operating in the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border area in 1976 and 1977<sup>58</sup> are difficult to credit at the higher range, although it is clear that substantial reinforcements were deployed to Irian Jaya in association with widespread unrest and the national elections in 1977. Reinforcements of 10,000 or more (division to division plus strength) would place a severe strain on military resources both within and without Kodam VIlll. Questions arise concerning troop availability (in view of Indonesia's preoccupation with East Timor), the level of threat to warrant the deployment, and the military's ability to establish a viable command and control network to support such a deployment. The transportation, resupply, housing and costs involved in the protracted deployment of such large numbers of troops raise further queries.<sup>59</sup> It is more likely that an additional battalion (700 troops) or, at most, a brigade (three battalions plus integral support numbering around 3,000) would be brought to the province for a major counter-insurgency operation. The deployment of even a brigade, however, would strain the province's infrastructure considerably.<sup>60</sup>

#### SUMMARY

Overall, the number of military personnel in Irian Jaya is around

9,000 made up of 5,000 Army, 3,500 Police and 500 Navy and Air Force personnel. This number could rise depending on periodic deployments from outside the province but is unlikely to exceed 10,000 at any particular time.<sup>61</sup> Three out of the four battalions permanently located in Irian Jaya are manned by Irianese troops and dispersed on internal security and development tasks. A fourth, non-Irianese, battalion is assigned to Irian Jaya for a few years before being rotated with another out-of-area battalion. Additional forces from Kostrad and Kopassus are sent to Irian Jaya for the conduct of operations. There are no artillery or anti-aircraft units in the large area covered by Indonesia's two easternmost provinces, Maluku and Irian Jaya.<sup>62</sup> Merauke regency, located in the south-east corner of Irian Jaya and covering an area almost twice the size of Tasmania, is garrisoned by one infantry company.


The Navy has no ships stationed permanently in Irian Jaya and the nearest primary naval base is at Ambon which reports to Eastern Fleet headquarters in Surabaya, Java. Small naval stations, which report to Ambon, are located in Irian Jaya's major coastal towns. Almost all of Indonesia's aircraft are located on Java and the Air Force operational command responsible for eastern Indonesia is located in Sulawesi. The main Air Force bases in Irian Jaya house helicopters and light aircraft and the military is largely dependent on missionary aircraft for transportation to isolated areas. Combat aircraft are deployed to Irian Jaya for operations and training flights.

Two interrelated conclusions arise from this summation. First,




the dearth of conventional military forces (Kostrad, Kopassus), combat arms (artillery, anti-aircraft and armoured units), aircraft and ships, as well as the dispersal of the territorial battalions throughout Irian Jaya provides an indication that the military is concerned more with internal, rather than external, threats. In other words, Indonesia does not appear to foresee an external threat arising from Papua New Guinea or northern Australia, at least in the short term.


Second, given the strength and calibre of Army troops in Irian Jaya, combined with the very limited naval and air support, the military in Irian Jaya has an extremely limited capacity for offensive action. There would need to be a substantial and prolonged reinforcement of ships, aircraft and troops before Indonesia could pose a military threat from Irian Jaya to its near neighbours.

Figure 1. Military Area Command (Kodam) Headquarters<sup>1</sup>

Notes: 1. Personnel numbers are unknown. 2. Commander is a major-general; the chief of staff a brigadier-general. 3. There are four Korems in Kodam V111. 4. Kodim 1701 in Kodam V111. 5. 733 infantry battalion, Ambon. 6. No artillery or anti-aircraft units in Kodam V111.

Figure 2. Military Sub-Area Command (Korem) Headquarters<sup>1</sup>


Notes: 1. There are four Korems in Kodam VI111 - three in Irian Jaya and one in Maluku. 2. Personnel numbers are listed in order of officers, senior non-commissioned officers, other ranks and civilians. Total personnel strength is 363 including 63 civilians (30/97/163/63). 3. The commander is a colonel, the chief of staff a lieutenant-colonel, section heads are majors, and company commanders captains.

Figure 3. Military District Command (Kodim) Headquarters<sup>1</sup>

Notes: 1. There are nine Kodims in Irian Jaya. 2. Personnel numbers are given in order of officers, senior non-commissioned officers, other ranks and civilians. Total personnel strength is 46 (6/16/7/17). 3. The commander is a lieutenant-colonel, the chief of staff a major and section heads captains. The head of the intelligence section is responsible for intelligence, territorial and social-political matters; the head of the administration section for personnel and logistics.




Figure 4. Military Sector Command (Koramil) Headquarters




Note: 1. Personnel numbers are given in the order of officers, senior non-commissioned officers, other ranks and civilians. Total personnel strength is 7 excluding village management non-commissioned officers. The Koramil commander is a junior officer or senior non-commissioned officer.


Figure 5. Organisation of Territorial Infantry Battalions

Territorial infantry battalion (dispersed)<sup>1</sup>

Notes: 1. This is the organisation of 751, 752 and 753 infantry battalions in Irian Jaya which are dispersed within their Korem's boundaries. The dispersed battalions have four rifle companies and no support company. The organisation of the rifle companies is the same as that depicted in Figure 6. 2. Personnel numbers are given in order of officers, senior non-commissioned officers and other ranks. Personnel numbers for the headquarters and administrative sections are unknown. Total strength is around 700. The command element consists of a commanding officer, a second-in-command, a head of the intelligence/operations section and a head of the personnel/logistics section.

Territorial infantry battalion (centralised)<sup>1</sup>

Note: 1. This is the organisation of a centralised (companies co-located) territorial infantry battalion such as 733 infantry battalion in Ambon, the mobile battalion in Kodam V111. Total strength is 746.

Figure 6. Organisation of an Infantry Battalion (Brigaded)<sup>1</sup>

Notes: 1. This is the organisation of an infantry battalion from Kostrad, one of which is sometimes assigned to Irian Jaya as the out-of-area battalion. 2. Personnel numbers are given in order of officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks. Total strength is 736. 3. The command element consists of a commanding officer (lieutenant colonel); a second-in-command (major); intelligence, operations, personnel and logistics sections headed by captains; and a doctor. Company commanders are captains.

## Notes to Chapter 2:

1. For example, Kees Lagerberg, *West Papua and Jakarta Imperialism*, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1979, p.113, states: 'The number of military in the Dutch period - about 12,000 - has been more than doubled, concentrated in a few towns'.

2. Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen is quoted in *The Australian Magazine*, 17-18 June 1989: 'Indonesia is OK while Suharto is there, but they are teeming millions and they are breaking into New Guinea'. Sir Joh is not alone in this view. See 'Who threatens Australia?', *The Bulletin*, 27 June 1989, p.23. A response to this view is given in J.A.C. Mackie, 'Does Indonesia have expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea?' in R.J. May, *Between Two Nations*, Robert Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1986, pp.65-84.

3. Based on my experience in the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, 1981-82, but revealed clearly in, for example, Papua New Guinea's reaction to the discovery in 1983 that the Trans-Irian Highway (a road planned to link Jayapura and Merauke) had crossed into Papua New Guinea in three places.

4. See, for example, Kwasi Nyamekye and Ralph R. Premdas, 'Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Relations over Irian Jaya', *Asian Survey*, XI, 10, October 1979, pp.937, 944; Ralph R. Premdas, 'The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM): Continuity and Change in Papua New Guinea Relations with Indonesia', *Kabar Seberang*, 15, July 1985, p.78; and Marko Milivojevic, 'The Indonesian National Army', *Armed Forces*, 8, 8, August 1989, p.372.

5. James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*, The Jacaranda Press, Milton, 1983, pp.292, 312.

6. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, (Armed Forces Daily), 6 November 1990, p.1.

7. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, London, 1990, p.163.

8. Information on the three primary commands is drawn from *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, op. cit; John Haseman, 'Indonesia's new generation of military leaders', *Pacific Defence Reporter*, September 1987, pp.9-12; Special Report, 'Indonesia's ABRI - Part 1', *Asian Defence Journal* 5/86, pp.4-15; H.A. Josephs, 'Indonesia: Complex requirements and a huge task', *Pacific Defence Reporter*, March 1985; Seskoad, 'PPRC Pusat', (Central Ready Reaction Force), Bandung, 17 January 1987; and HQ TNI-AD, 'Organisasi TNI-AD', (Organisation of the Army), Ceramah Asops Kasad pada Kuliah Kerja Pasis Kursus Persiapan Seskoad T.P. 1986/1987, 21 June 1986.

9. See Figure 6. The establishment numbers are 37, 146 and 736 respectively.

10. The brigade and divisional strengths are estimates.

11. David Jenkins, 'Restive province is far from an armed camp', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 December 1985, p.8; Tapol, West Papua:



*The Obliteration of a People*, London, 1983, p.73.

12. Tapol Bulletin No 98, April 1990, p.13.

13. Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985, pp.74, 97, 98, 101, 141, 147, 150, 153, 154, 180; Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia Since Sukarno*, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1971, p.131; William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement*, Seton Hall University Press, 1973, p.223, refers to 'crack Indonesian paratroops hastily flown in from Java'; see also bulletins from *Tapol: The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign*, *passim*.

14. *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, *op. cit.*, p.163.

15. *Inside Indonesia*, June 1990, p.10, reported that five members of Kopassus were posted to the Freeport mine at Tembagapura on a rotational basis.

16. Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p.222; Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967*, Oxford University Press, Selangor, 1982, pp.141-2; Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, Fontana/Collins, 1980, p.94; David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 1984, p.43.

17. HQ TNI-AD, 'Pokok-pokok Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Daerah Militer (Kodam)', (Organisation and Tasks of a Kodam), Kasad Kep/4/1/1985, 12 January 1985; HQ TNI-AD, 'Pokok-pokok Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Resor Militer (Korem)', Kasad Kep/14/X11/1984, 26 December 1984; HQ TNI-AD, 'Pokok-pokok Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Distrik Militer (Kodim)', Kasad Kep/2/1/1985, 10 January 1985; HQ TNI-AD, 'Pokok-pokok Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Rayon Militer (Koramil)', Kasad Kep/3/1/1985, 10 January 1985. These are standard organisations. It is not known if there are regional variations applicable to Irian Jaya.

18. Widjiono Wasis (ed.), *Ensiklopedi Nusantara*, (An Encyclopaedia of Indonesia), Mawar Gempita, Jakarta, 1989, p.745.

19. This order of battle has been carefully compiled from *Harian Umum AB* and its successor *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata* (Armed Forces Daily) over five years, 1986-90. It is not practical to list the many hundreds of references from this source. Almost without exception, however, the information was obtained from the section in the paper headed *Warna Warta ABRI* (Armed Forces Miscellany).

20. It may be that Koramil commanders in Irian Jaya are responsible for several sub-districts (Kecamatan) but I have been unable to verify this.

21. *Berita Buana*, (World News), Jakarta, 20 January 1989, p.10.

22. John Haseman, *op. cit.*, p.12.

23. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 22 August 1988, p.X. Aside from the company in Merauke, one company is presumably located at Wamena and the remaining two companies in Jayapura with the battalion's headquarters. The same pattern could be expected in Korem 171 and Korem 173, that is to say, two companies located with the battalion's headquarters and one company in each of the remaining two Kodims.

24. For reference to section or sub-section posts, see Michael Byrnes, *Australian Financial Review*, 2 November 1984, p.6; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.147; David Jenkins, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 December 1985, p.8;

25. *Harian Umum AB*, 7 November 1986, p.V1. Kodim commanders have often commanded battalions prior to assignment to a Kodim so are usually relatively senior lieutenant-colonels. See *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 11 August 1989, p.X.

26. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 1 November 1988, p.X11. I believe a similar ethnic composition applies within 752 and 753 battalions. This proportion accords with reports over many years in the Armed Forces Daily newspaper. Photographs and family names indicate that private soldiers and junior non-commissioned officers in the territorial battalions in Irian Jaya are predominantly Melanesian whilst officers are predominantly non-Melanesian. Not all commentators agree. Peter Hastings in R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.222, writes that 'more than 400 of (the military's) total strength of 2,300 are Irianese'. Tom Lassner, 'Irian Jaya's bush war drags on', *Times on Sunday*, 18 October 1987, p.9, states that there are 'about 800 soldiers of Irianese origin' (out of 3,000 troops). An article in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 September 1985, p.8, states 'Irianese...form...only about one-third of the three battalions'. However, for the reasons noted above, I believe these reports understate the percentage of Irianese in the territorial battalions.

27. David Jenkins, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 December 1985, p.8.

28. A businessman advised that a Kostrad battalion was based in Sarmi on the north coast of Jayapura regency (Korem 172) in 1987.

29. Seskoad, *Lembar Pendahuluan Juklap Batalyon Infanteri*, (Introductory Sheet to the Infantry Battalion Field Manual), brochure 3123, Annex A, 1987, pp.1-3.

30. The figure of 5,000 is based on three territorial battalions ( $3 \times 700 = 2,100$ ), one Kostrad battalion (736), one Kodam headquarters of 900 (an estimate based on Figure 6 and including 250 engineers, 100 military police, 70 in communications and 50 in transport), three Korem headquarters ( $3 \times 300 = 900$ ), nine Kodim headquarters ( $9 \times 29 = 261$ ) and around 100 personnel in Koramil headquarters. In comparison, Henderson, *op. cit.*, p.224, states that the military commander in West New Guinea had '6,000 troops at his disposal' in 1969. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.50, mentions 'an Indonesian troop presence of 10,000 men' in 1970. Peter Hastings notes 'a total of about 3,400 troops' in 1984. (See Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,



1984, p.136.) David Jenkins, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 December 1985, p.8, states Indonesia 'has only a 2,700-man force in Irian Jaya'. Peter Hastings wrote in 1986 (R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.222) that 'Indonesia has only three battalions, 735, 736 and 737 in Irian Jaya, (and) more than 400 of its total strength of 2,300 are Irianese'. Tom Lassner, *Times on Sunday*, 18 October 1987, p.9, states 'Indonesia maintains more than 3,000 troops in Irian Jaya'. George Mombiot gives a figure of 4,000 soldiers in *Poisoned Arrows*, Michael Joseph, London, 1989, pp.184, 218. Of these descriptions, only Hastings provides explanatory detail but is incorrect in both articles as to the numerical identification and locations of the territorial battalions.

31. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 15 March 1989, p.X.

32. *ibid.*, 15 October 1990, p.V11.

33. *Harian Umum AB*, 10 September 1986, p.V1; 22 September 1986, p.V1; 10 December 1986, p.V1; 14 January 1987, p.V1. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 26 October 1988, p.X.

34. *Harian Umum AB*, 12 March 1987, p.V1; 18 March 1987, p.V1. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 10 April 1987, p.X; 14 May 1987, p.X; 28 November 1988, p.X; 8 December 1988, p.X.

35. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 7 December 1990, p.V11.

36. *ibid.*, 15 October 1990, p.V11.

37. *ibid.*, 19 October 1987, p.X.

38. R.J. May, *op. cit.*, pp.117-18, describes the intrusion of Indonesian air force F5E aircraft over Green River in Papua New Guinea. See also Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.181.

39. Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.38, 40, 75, 96, 104.

40. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 1 August 1989, p.V11; 3 August 1990, p.V11; Tapol Bulletin No 101, October 1990, p.2.

41. Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: The Transformation of a Melanesian Economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, p. 59; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.103; Tapol Bulletins No 88, August 1988, No 89, October 1988, and No 90, December 1988; *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 February 1987, p.9.

42. Tapol Bulletin No 90, December 1988, p.8.

43. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 1 September 1987, p.X; 5 May 1988, p.X; 30 September 1988, p.X; 25 July 1990, p.V11.

44. *ibid.*, 8 December 1988, p.X; 31 December 1988, p.X.

45. *ibid.*, 21 July 1987, p.X; 26 April 1989, p.X.

46. *Harian Umum AB*, 14 June 1986, p.V1. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 13 June 1987, p.X; 14 October 1987, p.X.

47. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 26 April 1989, p.X.
48. *Harian Umum AB*, 14 June 1986, p. V1; *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 18 December 1987, p.X; 10 July 1990, p.V11. The estimate of 3,500 police is consistent with Hastings' figure 'of about 3,400 troops in addition to a slightly larger police force' cited in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.136, although Hastings' figure for troops is understated, as noted in note 30 above. I have been unable to obtain other than fragmentary details of the police mobile brigade structure in Irian Jaya. David Jenkins writes that 'the police force, the bulk of its NCOs and other ranks Melanesian, is backed by two Brimob (police mobile brigade) battalions, each of about 400 men. These units...give the local military commander an extra force to deploy in times of trouble'. (See *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 December 1985, p.8.) Based on the infrequency of reports on the mobile brigades in the *Armed Forces Daily* newspaper over several years, I believe the estimate of 800 police in mobile brigades in Jayapura to be too high.
49. R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.95; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.136.
50. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.165.
51. R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.128.
52. R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.129; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.179; E.P. Wolfers, *Beyond the Border*, UPNG and USP, Waigani and Suva, 1988, p.112. Papua New Guinea's foreign secretary and Indonesia's ambassador to Papua New Guinea later inspected the village. Indonesian army rations were found in the area.
53. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.99.
54. Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.97-8, 147; R.J. May, *op. cit.*, pp.60, 113-14.
55. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.147, notes the special nature of operations.
56. *Tapol Bulletin* No 98, April 1990, p.13.
57. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.65.
58. R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.93; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.63; Peter Savage and Rose Martin, 'The OPM in West Papua New Guinea: The Continuing Struggle against Indonesian Colonialism', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 7, 3, 1977, p.342; Peter Savage, 'Irian Jaya: Reluctant Colony', Ron Crocombe and A. Ali (eds), *Politics in Melanesia*, Institute of Pacific Studies, USP, Suva, 1982, p.24.
59. The Indonesian intelligence summary reproduced in *Tapol*, *op. cit.*, pp.107-114, seems to confirm that government forces were thin on the ground, at least in Jayawijaya regency in 1977. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the government was widespread.
60. Malcolm Gault-Williams, 'Organisasi Papua Merdeka: The Free Papua Movement Lives', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 19,



4, 1987, p.43, wrote that Indonesia launched Operation Saute (sic) in 1986 with five divisions. As this would involve the deployment of 50-75,000 troops, the use of the word division is presumably in error.

61. A written request to the commander of Kodam Vlll for, inter alia, the numerical strength of the Indonesian Armed Forces in Irian Jaya was unanswered.

62. I also found no reference to armoured units in Indonesian sources. However, in Tapol, *op. cit.*, p.23, there is reference to 'Indonesian tank-borne troops' operating in 1963. Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1978, p.178, notes the presence of 'an armoured car' in 1969, presumably in Jayapura. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.45, notes the use of 'armoured cars' to disperse protestors in 1969, again presumably in Jayapura. More recently, Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.218, mentions the presence of 'armoured cars' in Jayapura. It thus appears there is a light armoured car unit in Jayapura, but no tanks.

### 3. THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY IN IRIAN JAYA

This chapter examines the objectives of the military in Irian Jaya and the implementation of development policies. A major concern of the military in Irian Jaya is to maintain security so that development programs can proceed unhindered. Problems arise in the pursuit of this goal because security is maintained by excessive resort to force and because the military's view of development has both a physical and a mental dimension. Attempts to inculcate in the Irianese a mental attitude amenable to military ideas of progress and development, combined with efforts to enhance national integration through transmigration, have caused dissatisfaction. Slow progress in the difficult task of building infrastructure and providing services in isolated, inland areas has added to the dissatisfaction. The perception of neglect, the climate of contempt and unfair competition, and heavy-handed methods to enforce security, have contributed to a feeling of alienation which, in its most extreme form, is expressed in armed rebellion.

#### MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN IRIAN JAYA

In the absence of any definitive statement,<sup>1</sup> military objectives in Irian Jaya must be discerned from official statements, known

objectives under the territorial development program, the operation of security and social-political organisations, military operations and the attitude of the military towards the people.

Official military statements provide an indication of the role of the military in Indonesia, and by analogy, in Irian Jaya, yet need to be treated with some caution. As noted in chapter 1, there is a gulf between the idealism espoused in stated objectives and the harsh reality of policy implementation in the province.

One objective is 'to supervise and prod the civil authorities'<sup>2</sup> and to motivate the population to achieve development goals. Another objective is to be accepted and supported by the people because Indonesia's defence doctrine is based on the people and the armed forces defending the nation in concert.<sup>3</sup> These objectives are encompassed under the term 'territorial development'.

Kodam commanders, including the commander of Kodam VIlll, are responsible for territorial development within their military area command.<sup>4</sup> Territorial development aims to foster national resilience or a condition in which the people are imbued with a desire to support the national ideology, the government and its policies. Territorial development also involves training the people to defend the nation and the implementation of civic action programs to create a sense of unity between the people and the armed forces.<sup>5</sup>

Indonesia's system of total people's defence and security (*Sishankamrata*) is based on the armed forces and the people combining to defeat an invader who has succeeded in breaching Indonesia's conventional defences through guerilla warfare and a 'never surrender' policy.<sup>6</sup> The trained population (*rakyat terlatih*) is made up of three organisations: people's resistance (*Wanra*), people's security (*Kamra*), and civil defence (*Hansip*).<sup>7</sup>

The people's resistance is controlled by the Army. In war, people's resistance units would provide reinforcements for regular units, collect intelligence, guard vital installations and harass the enemy. People's security is an organisation of police auxiliaries trained by the police to assist with the maintenance of law and order at village level. Civil defence, controlled by the provincial government with technical assistance from ABRI, is responsible for routine civil defence tasks such as assistance in the event of natural disasters as well as 'neighbourhood watch' functions.<sup>8</sup>

In theory, each village in Irian Jaya should contain a 10-man section of people's resistance as well as sections of people's security and civil defence. 30-man platoons of people's resistance, people's security and civil defence should be available in sub-district capitals (for example, Tanahmerah in Merauke regency) and 150-man companies of the three organisations in regency capitals (such as Merauke).<sup>9</sup>

From the fragmentary reports to hand, it is clear that the organisation of the 'trained population' in Irian Jaya is a



distant goal rather than a reality. The provincial head of civil defence - an infantry lieutenant-colonel - attributed the problem in euphemistic terms to 'personnel and organisational problems'.<sup>10</sup> The Kodam commander has spoken of the need to raise the quantity and quality of military personnel in Irian Jaya and of the necessity to provide the required facilities, financial support and transportation before the population can be trained effectively.<sup>11</sup> The apparent difficulty in obtaining grass roots support for the 'trained population' doctrine provides an indication of the gap between the people and the military.

There is far more information available on civic action operations in Irian Jaya, presumably because of their utility in public relations. These operations are aimed at assisting development but have the equally important objective of uniting the military and the people.<sup>12</sup> They are referred to as AMD operations (*ABRI Masuk Desa*: 'ABRI returns to the villages'). A large operation in 1990 involved five company-sized groups operating in five regencies (Kodim) over a three-week period.<sup>13</sup>

As with development, the objectives of AMD operations are both physical and ideological. Aside from the construction or refurbishment of infrastructure, national awareness, welfare and defence goals are pursued.<sup>14</sup> Areas chosen for civic action tasks may have some or all of the following characteristics: a relatively low level of development, *rawan* (insecure) in security terms, strategically located in geographical terms and identified in regional development programs as suitable for development projects.<sup>15</sup> The civic action programs may offset some

of the negative aspects of internal security operations, heavy-handedness and intolerance although they may also exacerbate them. In any case, the duplication of development programs and competing priorities of civil and military bodies must add to the complexity of coordinating development activities in Irian Jaya.<sup>16</sup>

The organisation and operation of several security and social-political organisations in Irian Jaya confirms the stress placed on the maintenance of security (through the collection of intelligence) as well as the influence, scope and pervasiveness of the military in the province.

As the chairman of the Area Co-ordinating Body for the Maintenance of National Security (*Bakorstanasda*), the commander of Kodam Vlll is responsible for the maintenance of security in Irian Jaya and Maluku.<sup>17</sup> *Bakorstanas* became operational in April 1989 as the successor organisation to the Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order (*Kopkamtib*). It is considered by the military to be more flexible and more representative than its predecessor body and presumably less likely to draw domestic or international criticism.<sup>18</sup>

The regional body in Jayapura is made up of around 10 permanent members, a small secretariat and a number of provincial department heads (*Kakanwil*) as non-permanent members who can be called upon for advice or assistance according to the matter under consideration. The permanent members include the Kodam commander, the provincial governor, the senior government legal

representative, the area police chief, representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force appointed by the Kodam commander, and the Korem commanders.<sup>19</sup>

The main concern of Bakorstanas is internal security and Bakorstanas is responsible to ensure that development programs proceed unhindered by anti-government and anti-Pancasila elements.<sup>20</sup> The 'screening' of public servants to ensure they are untainted by previous involvement in 'extreme organisations' (such as the communist party and, presumably, the Free Papua Movement) is a major preoccupation of the body.<sup>21</sup> The commander of Kodam Vlll has warned against the latent danger of communism and subversion, problems arising from the misuse of weapons, explosives and communications, as well as the need to make the government apparatus more effective and responsible. The latter remark can be interpreted as a mild expression for eradicating corruption and inefficiency.<sup>22</sup>

The consultative and coordinative forum known as the Area Leader's Conference (*Muspida*) enables military authorities to influence decision-making and decision implementation at both provincial and regency level.<sup>23</sup> At the provincial level in Irian Jaya, the governor, Kodam commander, area police chief and senior legal officer meet regularly to coordinate the implementation of government policy and development programs as well as to assess the security situation.<sup>24</sup> Similar representatives attend the Area Leader's Conference in Maluku province where the Kodam commander is represented by the commander of Korem 174. At regency level, the regent, Kodim commander, head of the police sub-area, and the



regency's legal officer conduct a similar consultative forum. In 1988, five of the nine regents in Irian Jaya were military appointees.<sup>25</sup>

The commander of Kodam Vlll is also Chairman of the Social Political Council of Area 'H' (*Dewan Sosial Politik Daerah 'H'*) covering Irian Jaya and Maluku. As such, he chairs the board that selects military and police personnel for non-military appointments in the Kodam. Such appointments include, for example, one-fifth of the seats in the provincial and district parliaments,<sup>26</sup> thereby ensuring that the military is well placed to monitor and influence policy.

From the perspective of the implementation of military authority, military operations to maintain or restore security provide the clearest indication of why the indigenous inhabitants have been reluctant to accept the authority of the Indonesian government.<sup>27</sup>

From the beginning, the military acted more like conquerors than liberators.<sup>28</sup> The frequency of military operations is indicative of the friction between the Indonesian administration and the Irianese population, or at least a considerable proportion of it.<sup>29</sup> The operations appear to involve a disproportionate use of military force following isolated security incidents and include collective punishment against villages.<sup>30</sup> Far from improving security, military operations probably have the effect of swelling the ranks of the dissatisfied.<sup>31</sup>

Soon after the transfer of the province to Indonesia in 1963, the

military became involved in operations against the Arfak people in the Manokwari area from 1965 to 1969.<sup>32</sup> In 1967, in the course of these operations, Indonesian troops killed at least 200 rebellious tribesmen in the Bird's Head area and the Air Force strafed Manokwari, resulting in the deaths of 40 people (according to the estimate of the military commander).<sup>33</sup> In 1968, operations continued in the Bird's Head region against Arfak tribesmen led by the Mandatjan brothers and Frits Awom.<sup>34</sup>

In April 1969, prior to the Act of Free Choice, a revolt broke out in the Enarotali area of the western highlands. It involved an uprising of tribesmen augmented by 95 indigenous police deserters.<sup>35</sup> Pay and other grievances provided a spark for the rebellion but it also appears that the people wanted to decide their own future 'free from Javanese pressure'.<sup>36</sup>

Military operations continued throughout the 1970s. In May 1970, troops were airlifted from Java to the Baliem Valley in the central highlands to launch an operation against rebel tribesmen.<sup>37</sup> Dissident activity recurred in 1977 and 1978 in the central highlands, Tembagapura and along the border, associated with the general election in 1977, modernisation campaigns and the alienation of land.<sup>38</sup> The subsequent military operations included the bombing and strafing of villages and reports of napalm use.<sup>39</sup> Operations in the central highlands in 1977 resulted in the deaths of 250 people and the postponement of voting.<sup>40</sup>

Operation Clean Sweep in 1981 in the central highlands and

Jayapura regency reportedly involved the bombardment of villages and large-scale loss of life.<sup>41</sup> The 1984 disturbances in Jayapura included the desertion of around 100 soldiers from 751 battalion, many of whom crossed into Papua New Guinea.<sup>42</sup>

Irianese animosity to the Indonesian administration and the military appears to be substantial.<sup>43</sup> The disillusionment with Indonesian administration dates from well before the 1969 Act of Free Choice. In 1965, for example, a leader of the former New Guinea Council complained of midnight arrests, beatings and shootings of Papuan nationalists.<sup>44</sup> In 1967, indigenous Irianese representatives of the national parliament demanded the withdrawal of 'rocket and other military installations' and an end to strafing and rocket attacks on villages.<sup>45</sup> In 1968, an Australian journalist wrote of the sporadic brutality of the Army which carried out numerous beatings, shootings and goings of Papuans in order to ensure a passive population in the lead-up to the Act of Free Choice.<sup>46</sup>

Reports of brutality, corruption and misuse of authority by military personnel are too common to dismiss.<sup>47</sup> Australian military personnel involved in the mapping of Irian Jaya in 1977 reported indiscriminate shooting of the local population.<sup>48</sup> In 1984, shock waves from the murder by special forces soldiers of the renowned Irianese anthropologist, Arnold Ap, reverberated internationally.<sup>49</sup> Amnesty International has voiced concern at reports of misconduct by military personnel in Irian Jaya noting that 'safeguards during interrogation and custody appear to be inadequate to prevent torture and ill-treatment from



occurring'.<sup>50</sup> Examples of military-run rackets such as the compulsory log-felling by Asmat tribesmen and the illegal harvesting of wildlife are well documented,<sup>51</sup> and military personnel have allegedly intimidated Irianese to provide land for transmigration sites.<sup>52</sup>

That it is necessary to remind troops that 'the military's presence should not cause misery to the people but rather raise their welfare'<sup>53</sup> is a sign of poor discipline and lack of accountability in the armed forces. Such behaviour must have a negative effect on the Irianese people and provide a hollow ring to the motto of soldiers in Kodam Vlll as 'protectors of the people'.

Crossings of the border into Papua New Guinea reflect a regular cycle of rebellion, military response and flight to safety. The frequency and scale of the crossings indicate discontent, fear of the military, or fear of becoming involved in military or dissident operations.<sup>54</sup> At a rough estimate, around 20,000 Irianese have crossed into Papua New Guinea since Indonesia gained control of the province: 1963-66: 573; 1967: 866; 1968: 1,200; 1969: 1700; 1977-78: 3,000; 1983: 1,000; 1984: 11,000.<sup>55</sup> Many of these border-crossers have returned to Irian Jaya but others are too frightened to return, preferring instead to forsake their land and remain in Papua New Guinea.<sup>56</sup>

Many of the crossings are associated with military operations held to ensure security in the lead-up to national elections.<sup>57</sup> Kodam Vlll lists with pride operations to make the province

secure for general elections in 1971, 1977, 1982 and 1987, and for sittings of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1972, 1978, 1983 and 1988 to elect the President and ratify state policy.<sup>58</sup> Calls by the commander of the armed forces to prevent disturbances to the 1992 elections throughout Indonesia began well in advance of the election.<sup>59</sup> Unless there has been a marked change in policy, a further flow of Irianese villagers into Papua New Guinea can be anticipated.

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

In general terms, the 'backwardness' of the Irianese and the province is popularly accepted in Indonesia.<sup>60</sup> The Irianese are considered to be at a comparatively low level of cultural evolution.<sup>61</sup> Villagers are seen as crude and simple-minded, as being in need of leadership, education and instruction.<sup>62</sup> There is a 'disinclination to see Melanesian culture as a culture in its own right' and a inclination to 'Javanise' as rapidly as possible.<sup>63</sup> Not surprisingly, the Indonesian image of the 'dumb Papuan' (*Papua boboh*) has inevitably brought alienation, frustration and resentment.<sup>64</sup>

The feeling that Irianese culture is on a lower level and has to be made Indonesian before the people can progress is widespread in military circles.<sup>65</sup> The feeling is expressed in terms of terminating the backwardness of the Irianese people and in the duty of the military to bring development and enlightenment to them.<sup>66</sup> Matters such as poor personal hygiene, the importance of

pigs, non-sedentary agriculture, tribal fighting and heavy drinking are viewed as impediments to the introduction of an outlook amenable to military conceptions of change and development.<sup>67</sup>

Notwithstanding the national motto of 'Unity in Diversity', there is, in the opinion of military authorities, a requirement for a 'cultural transformation' so that the Irianese can more readily accept development.<sup>68</sup> As noted earlier, development programs that improve welfare and raise the economic prosperity of the people are expected to have a beneficial effect on the security situation in the province.<sup>69</sup> In the view of military authorities, 'if the people (in Irian Jaya) are not prosperous, they will easily be swayed by (anti-government) propaganda'.<sup>70</sup>

The desire to change the culture of the Irianese is manifested in many ways.<sup>71</sup> For example, the first rice harvest in the Baliem Valley by Dani tribesmen in 1986 was regarded as a welcome sign of cultural assimilation and, accordingly, was greeted with due ceremony. At the time, the governor's message stated that it was important that the farmers 'should be made to love rice culture as they do the growing of their staple food plants, like the sweet potato'.<sup>72</sup> Similarly, the plan announced by President Suharto in 1969 to take 200,000 West Irianese children to other parts of Indonesia<sup>73</sup> is indicative of the desire to eliminate cultural differences between the Irianese and other Indonesians.<sup>74</sup> The same conclusion can be reached regarding efforts to force the Asmat people to destroy their longhouses and live in standard houses in family units.<sup>75</sup>



Operation *Koteka* (penis gourd), commenced in the early 1970s, was designed to bring the benefits of civilisation to the Dani people in the Baliem Valley. Managed by the Army, the name was based on the objective of persuading the highlanders to discard their penis gourds and to wear clothing.<sup>76</sup> Teams of around six, including soldiers, civil servants and students were despatched to villages for six months to teach the Dani personal hygiene, animal husbandry, life in a family unit and basic literacy.<sup>77</sup> The objectives of the operation were coloured by reports of corruption and oppression and the forcible curtailment of traditional ceremonies leading to a Dani revolt in 1977.<sup>78</sup>

The transmigration program also aims to diminish cultural differences<sup>79</sup> and facilitate national integration although the goals of the program are far broader than this. Transmigration is intended to raise the living standards of the transmigrants, increase national agricultural production, hasten the economic and social advancement of underdeveloped regions and relieve population pressure in Java and other areas.<sup>80</sup> The government says that the program is designed to help the Irianese learn new agricultural, marketing and other skills and benefit from infrastructure development.<sup>81</sup> Defence is also a function of the transmigration program with a view to establishing a buffer zone or security belt along the border with Papua New Guinea.<sup>82</sup>

The standard of living of the Irianese people is expected to improve through a process of social intercourse with the newcomers. 25 per cent of the places in the transmigration sites are reserved for local Irianese in the interests of acculturation

of the Irianese people.<sup>83</sup> The success of the program is judged in some respects by the readiness of the local population to welcome the transmigrants as part of their community. By this criterion, the program has not been successful.<sup>84</sup> One of the main problems in the program is the resentment and uncertainty caused by the alienation of traditional land. The government considers infrastructure development associated with the construction and servicing of transmigration sites sufficient compensation for the traditional landowners.<sup>85</sup> It is clear that many Irianese do not share this view because, traditionally, land remains in clan ownership in perpetuity.<sup>86</sup>

By 1990, around 150,000 officially-sponsored transmigrants had been settled in Irian Jaya together with a similar number of spontaneous or unassisted transmigrants.<sup>87</sup> The influx of the unassisted transmigrants - many from Sulawesi - has probably had a greater effect on the Irianese people, particularly in urban centres. The domination by unassisted transmigrants of unskilled wage labour, trade, transport, market gardening, fishing and logging has limited the employment opportunities of Irianese.<sup>88</sup>

As a result of efforts to force cultural change and the influx of newcomers, there is a feeling amongst many Irianese that they have been swamped by people who see no value in them or their culture.<sup>89</sup> There is a resentment at the presence of foreigners and a desire to be left alone to preserve their culture or change it in their own way.<sup>90</sup>

Well over 50 per cent of the population lives in isolated, inland



settlements with limited education or health facilities and restricted opportunities for employment. Most of the major towns are located on the coast. With few roads outside these towns, wider communication is dependent on sea and air transport. None of the nine regency capitals in Irian Jaya is connected by road with the capital of another regency and there are no roads linking the coast with the highlands. Air transport is expensive, limited and subject to the vagaries of the weather.<sup>91</sup> The supply of electricity, fresh water and the condition of infrastructure such as wharves is generally unsatisfactory.<sup>92</sup>

In terms of per capita grants from the national government, however, Irian Jaya fares comparatively well compared with other Indonesian provinces and a high proportion of the province's development expenditure is directed to infrastructure development, communications and education.<sup>93</sup> However, the extent to which the indigenous Irianese people are benefiting from development programs remains a vexed question.<sup>94</sup> The opportunities for growth and employment have been utilised largely by immigrants from other parts of Indonesia in urban centres.<sup>95</sup>

One cause of concern to the Irianese is the slow progress made in the provision of education and health services in isolated areas. In 1980, 80 per cent of school-age children reportedly attended primary school.<sup>96</sup> However, as a result of a shortage of teachers, the real figure - particularly in inland areas - may be closer to 50 per cent.<sup>97</sup> Teachers are reluctant to work in remote highland regions because of the isolation, lack of amenities, lack of



knowledge of local customs and languages, and because their salaries are late and promotions delayed.<sup>98</sup> Even in the province's capital, Jayapura, primary school teachers complain that their pay and rice quota are continually late.<sup>99</sup> The head of Taja village in Jayapura regency said that the 80 pupils at the village school had no teacher and were dependent for their education on two soldiers on temporary assignment in the area.<sup>100</sup> Many of the village heads in Paniai regency expressed dissatisfaction to the governor in 1990 because their village school had no teacher or because teachers who were assigned to their school did not return after taking holidays.<sup>101</sup>

The health system in isolated areas is equally unsatisfactory. Village heads have complained that their village has not benefited from development and that there has been little or no change from colonial times.<sup>102</sup> Many of the village health centres (*puskesmas pembantu*) have not functioned for years because of a shortage of medical assistants and medicines.<sup>103</sup> A village head from Dobo in northern Biak claimed that 15 villagers died from malaria in July 1990 because there were no medical staff at the village health centre.<sup>104</sup>

The feeling of neglect and the climate of contempt and unfair competition has made many Irianese feel like strangers in their own land.<sup>105</sup> This alienation is manifested in a pattern of flag-raising as a form of protest and in support for an independent West Papuan state.<sup>106</sup>

The Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* or OPM) numbers

around 500 dissidents in the field with a network of several thousand active sympathisers.<sup>107</sup> The statement by an Irianese that 'we are all OPM'<sup>108</sup> indicates the extent of passive support and the difficulty of estimating the numerical strength of the movement, let alone its influence.<sup>109</sup> Most OPM guerillas carry traditional weapons, including spears and bows and arrows.<sup>110</sup>

Notwithstanding the movement's limitations due to internal dissension, lack of equipment and foreign support, its very existence and persistence serves to question Indonesian policy and policy implementation in the province.<sup>111</sup> The reasons for its existence are similar to those of many other separatist movements - neglect, discrimination, oppression, and dissatisfaction with socio-economic changes.<sup>112</sup> Other reasons include the forced territorial incorporation into Indonesia, loss of cultural identity, alienation of land and political repression.<sup>113</sup>

In public statements, the military describes the OPM as a criminal organisation involved in murder, kidnapping and terrorism.<sup>114</sup> Consistent with this view, the commander of the Indonesian armed forces reminded journalists following the extradition of OPM leader Melky Salossa from Papua New Guinea, 'write that he is involved in crime, murder and creating security disturbances'.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, separatist groups (in Irian Jaya, East Timor, Aceh or elsewhere) are described by the term GPK which means 'disturbers of the peace' or 'gangsters'.<sup>116</sup> To credit the OPM with the title of freedom fighters or guerillas would be to acknowledge the existence of their cause and dissatisfaction with Indonesia's administration. Despite the lapse of time, the

movement is still painted as a continuation of the Dutch colonial policy of *divide et impera*.<sup>117</sup> The Dutch are held responsible for planting 'time bombs' in the form of the OPM programmed to explode after their withdrawal<sup>118</sup> and for putting the idea of independence into the minds of a simple people.<sup>119</sup>

Publicly, the movement is treated with disdain by authorities as if it did not exist. 'Separatist movements, like (the) OPM or whatever is the name, do not exist within (Irian Jaya)'.<sup>120</sup> Consequently, military operations against dissidents are mounted to prevent 'tribal clashes' and dissident activity is described as the exploitation of tribal clashes by third parties.<sup>121</sup>

In the military's view, the low level of education in the province and lack of critical thought are held responsible for the ease with which people are swayed against authority. In this view, the OPM exists because of the limited time of Indonesian administration and - with the majority of the Irianese population living in isolated, inland settlements - the limited contact of many Irianese with development programs. Accordingly, the Kodam commander called on rebels on the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea border 'to join with the people, the government and the armed forces' to develop the province and make it prosperous.<sup>122</sup> It is considered that development - in the broadest sense - will eventually resolve the problem of the OPM:<sup>123</sup>

'We should not assume that the attractiveness of the OPM to the people can be easily overcome. All the more so if our treatment of the people does not improve. Now is the time



for us to give greater attention to the younger generation, particularly those in primary schools, through improved guidance, better education and increased welfare. It is this young generation that we hope will lead Irian Jaya to a brighter future. With such guidance, they will feel part of the Indonesian family...Whatever happens, efforts for the complete development of Indonesian society in Irian Jaya must be hastened and increased...The existence and concept of the OPM and all its manifestations will disappear *with the success of development*.<sup>124</sup>

#### SUMMARY

The objectives of the military in Irian Jaya are to maintain security and to motivate the population to participate in, and achieve, state-formulated development goals. These objectives correspond with the dual function of ABRI in Indonesian society as a military force (a stabiliser) and a social-political force (a dynamiser and motivator of the Indonesian people).

As noted in chapter 1, security is viewed in holistic terms and efforts to improve security are directed to raising the ideological, political, economic, cultural and defence awareness of the people. Territorial development aims to improve security by fostering in the people a desire to defend the nation and support its ideology, government and policies. These goals have not been achieved in Irian Jaya.

The perception that the Indonesian people are easily led astray and need to be controlled tightly may be exacerbated in Irian Jaya where the indigenous people are considered to be at a relatively low level of cultural evolution. This perception may explain why comparatively minor security incidents attract such a harsh response from the military. Whatever the reasons, there is an intolerance to opposition and an inclination to employ excessive force in the pursuit of security objectives. Rather than improving security, the military's heavy-handed behaviour has encouraged dissatisfaction.

For the military, development is a high-priority goal because of the interrelationship perceived between the people's welfare and the level of security. Development programs take on an almost sacred mantle, whether or not they are of benefit to the indigenous population. In the estimation of the military, development is the key to good security and lack of development the cause of security problems. For the success of development programs (including programs to improve ideological and defence awareness as well as transmigration), a need is seen to 'Indonesianise' the Irianese so that they are better disposed to accept development and progress. Practical benefits from existing development programs appear to have favoured immigrants from other parts of Indonesia in urban centres of Irian Jaya.

The sense of neglect, fear and alienation felt by many Irianese is manifested in several ways including flag-raising as a form of protest, crossings of the border into Papua New Guinea and support for an independent West Papuan state.

## Notes to Chapter 3:

1. A written request to the commander of Kodam Vlll for military objectives in Irian Jaya was unanswered.
2. Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, Fontana/Collins, 1980, p.34.
3. Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967*, Oxford University Press, Selangor, 1982, pp.140-3; McDonald, *op. cit.*, p.33.
4. HQ TNI-AD, 'Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Tugas Komando Daerah Militer (Kodam)', (Organisation and Tasks of a Kodam), Kasad Kep/4/1/1985, 12 January 1985.
5. Seskoad, 'Sistem Pembinaan Territorial', (The Territorial Development System), brochure NSS 4112, Bandung, 1985, pp.1-8; Seskoad, 'Aspek Perencanaan dan Pengendalian Pembinaan Territorial', (Planning and Control Aspects of Territorial Development), brochure NSS 4113, Bandung, 1985.
6. McDonald, *op. cit.*, p.33. Sundhaussen, *op. cit.*, pp.58, 140.
7. R. Soedarno Hadisoetopo, *Komentar Pasal demi Pasal UU Hankamneg RI*, (An Article by Article Commentary on the Defence and Security Law), Alumni, Bandung, 1985, p.125.
8. Seskoad brochure 3342, 'Kodam Dalam Ops Binter', (The Kodam in Territorial Development Operations), Bandung, 1987. Responsibility for village-level security in Java has been devolved to the police. The effect of this on Wanra and Hansip is not known. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 March 1990, p.19.
9. An assumption, based on the standard figures used in staff planning exercises at the Indonesian Army Command and Staff College, 1986-87. See also Seskoad, 'Cadangan Nasional', (National Reserves), brochure NSS-4114-A, Bandung, 1986.
10. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, (Armed Forces Daily), 9 April 1988, p.X.
11. *ibid.*, 22 October 1990, p.V11.
12. Sundhaussen, *op. cit.*, pp.168, 173; Khalid Abdullah, 'The Indonesian Armed Forces: ABRI', *Asian Defence Journal*, 5, 1982, p.38; Albert C. Waldack and John B. Haseman, 'Dwi-Fungsi: The Indonesian Army in Civil Affairs', *Military Review*, September 1981, p.18.
13. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 13 July 1990, p.V11.
14. Construction projects may include houses, village halls, places of worship, soccer fields, volley-ball courts and the provision of water. National awareness programs may involve flag-raising ceremonies in schools, the singing of national songs and lectures on Indonesia's struggle for independence. Welfare objectives are pursued by providing information on gardening,



animal husbandry, health and family planning while defence and security objectives can involve 'neighbourhood watch' exercises (*latihan ronda kampung*) or lectures concerning juvenile delinquency. See *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 2 July 1990, p.V11; 5 September 1990, p.V11; 12 November 1990, p.V11.

15. *ibid.*, 2 July 1990, p.V11; 12 November 1990, p.V11.

16. Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: The Transformation of a Melanesian Economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, pp.24-5.

17. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 10 January 1989, p.X.

18. *ibid.*, 24 November 1988, p.X.

19. *ibid.*, 24 November 1988, p.X; 10 January 1989, p.X; 2 February 1989, p.X; 13 February 1989, p.X; 24 April 1989, p.X.

20. *ibid.*, 2 February 1989, p.X; 13 February 1989, p.X.

21. *ibid.*, 19 September 1990, p.V11; 20 July 1991, pp.1, X1.

22. *ibid.*, 10 January 1989, p.X; 6 February 1989, p.X.

23. Garnaut and Manning, *op. cit.*, pp.22-3; Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985, p.135; David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 1984, p.45; David Jenkins, 'Restive province is far from an armed camp', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 December 1985, p.8; Seskoad, 'Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 1986 tentang Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah', (President of Indonesia's Decision 10/1986 on the Area Leader's Conference), brochure NSS-4222, Bandung, 27 February 1986.

24. McDonald, *op. cit.*, p.94.

25. Eddy Supardi (ed.), *Kabinet Pembangunan V Beserta Buku Alamat Pejabat Negeri RI*, (The Fifth Development Cabinet and Address Book of Government Officials), Alda, Jakarta, 1989, p.X.

26. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 9 July 1987, p.X; 21 March 1989, p.X.

27. A chronological summary of ground and air operations is given in Malcolm Gault-Williams, 'Organisasi Papua Merdeka: The Free Papua Movement Lives', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 19, 4, 1987, p.38.

28. William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement*, Seton Hall University Press, 1973, p.217.

29. Peter Hastings, 'National Integration in Indonesia: The Case of Irian Jaya', Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1984, p.140.

30. Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.58, 61, 70, 93, 98.

31. *ibid.*, p.38.

32. An Indonesian account of these operations is given in A. Ismail et al., *Irian Barat dari Masa ke Masa*, (A Chronological Account of Irian Jaya), Sejarah Militer Kodam XV11/Cenderawasih, 1971.

33. Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia Since Sukarno*, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1971, pp.132-3; Henderson, *op. cit.*, p.223; Kees Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1979, p.111; Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978, p.167, notes that by August 1968, 168 tribesmen had been killed and more than 3,500 had surrendered. Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, Malmsbury, 1977, p.20, states that 1,000 were killed by the Air Force in Manokwari.

34. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p.145.

35. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, pp.145-6; Henderson, *op. cit.*, p.224; Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.173; Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.21.

36. Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.175.

37. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p.154.

38. Tapol, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, London, 1983, pp.95-7.

39. Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.66-8.

40. Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp.6, 24.

41. Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.74-6.

42. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.99.

43. George Monbiot, *Poisoned Arrows*, Michael Joseph, London, 1989, p.217.

44. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p.130.

45. *ibid.*, p.132.

46. *ibid.*, p.128. See also p.151.

47. Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.72-4; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.144.

48. Peter Savage, 'Irian Jaya: Reluctant Colony', R. Crocombe and A. Ali (eds), *Politics in Melanesia*, Institute of Pacific Studies, USP, Suva, 1982, p.26; Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.65-7.

49. 'Behind the killing of Arnold Ap', *Pacific Islands Monthly*, July 1984, p.21. See also Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.148-154; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.179;

50. 'Statement of Amnesty International's Concerns in Indonesia', No. ASA 21/33/85, International Secretariat, London, p.9.
51. Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.47-8; Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.123-4; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, pp.53, 160; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.143.
52. Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.130-1.
53. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 22 October 1990, p.V11.
54. R.J. May (ed.), *Between Two Nations*, Robert Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1986, pp.207-8.
55. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p.144; Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.4; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.176; R.J. May, *op. cit.*, pp.41, 57, 60, 89, 120; Savage, *op. cit.*, pp.17, 26. These sources vary in several details and some of the border-crossers may have sought refuge in Papua New Guinea on more than one occasion. R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.135, estimates that there are around 2,000-3,000 Irian-born permanent residents in Papua New Guinea.
56. Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.8.
57. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.136.
58. '38 tahun Kodam V111/Trikora', (38 years of Kodam V111/Trikora), *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 1 August 1990, p.V11.
59. *ibid.*, 19 September 1990, p.1.
60. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p.153; Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.69-70.
61. Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.180; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.19; E.P. Wolfers (ed.), *Beyond the Border*, UPNG and USP, Waigani and Suva, 1988, p.113.
62. Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.36; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.xvi; Tapol, *op. cit.*, p.58; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, pp.54, 152.
63. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, pp.129-30; Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.34, 137, 140.
64. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, pp.126-7; Lagerberg, *op. cit.*, p.7.
65. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.77.
66. Ismail, *op. cit.*, pp.xvii-xviii, 220.
67. Lieutenant-General Kahpi Suriadireja, 'Berbagai Permasalahan di Irian Jaya', (Problems in Irian Jaya), *Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Teknologi*, 2, Jakarta, 1985, *passim*; Lieutenant-General Kahpi Suriadireja, 'Pengembangan Irian Jaya ditinjau dari segi ketahanan nasional', (Development in Irian Jaya from the viewpoint of national resilience), Manuel Kasiepo et al. (eds), *Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedalaman Irian Jaya*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1987, *passim*.



68. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 22 October 1990, p.V11.
69. Suriadireja, 'Development in Irian Jaya from the viewpoint of national resilience', *op. cit.*, pp.56, 67.
70. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 22 October 1990, p.V11.
71. Parallels with Australia's treatment of aborigines are clear. Donald Thomson, writing in 1936, said: 'Most of the projects that have so far been advanced for dealing with Aborigines assume at once that their culture is to be destroyed; they aim vaguely at 'betterment' of the people...Another almost invariable assumption is that the first essential in dealing with Australian Aborigines is to curtail their wanderings, to settle them either in a compound or an institution, or to remove their children from their custody to these places in order that they shall grow up without any knowledge of the life and customs of their own people'. Donald Thomson, *Donald Thomson in Arnhem Land*, Currey O'Neil Ross, Melbourne, 1983, p.79.
72. 'Dani tribesmen have first rice harvest in Baliem Valley', *Jakarta Post*, 17 September 1986, p.3.
73. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p.154; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.178.
74. Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.229.
75. *ibid.*, pp.149, 159.
76. Garnaut and Manning, *op. cit.*, p.24.
77. *ibid.*, pp.90-1; Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.25.
78. Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.67-8; Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.63-6; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, pp.178-9.
79. Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.229.
80. For a discussion of transmigration, see Chris Manning and Michael Rumbiak, *Economic Development, Migrant Labour and Indigenous Welfare in Irian Jaya 1970-1984*, Monograph, Australian National University, 1987; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*; H. Arndt in R.J. May, *op. cit.*; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.126.
81. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.141; Tapol, *op. cit.*, p.60; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.40; 'Policies for Irian Jaya blameless: Dr Mochtar', *Canberra Times*, 17 November 1985.
82. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.141; Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.52-3; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.231; Suriadireja, 'Problems in Irian Jaya', *op. cit.*, p.11.
83. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.142; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.132.
84. Loekman Soetrisno, 'Peranan Transmigrasi dalam Stabilitas Sosial Politik Daerah Perbatasan and Problematikanya: Kasus Irian Jaya', (The Role of Transmigration in the Social-Political

Stability of Border Areas: The Case of Irian Jaya), Sri-Edi Swasono and Masri Singarinbun (eds), *Sepuluh Windhu Transmigrasi di Indonesia 1905-1985*, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 1985, pp.115-127.

85. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.130; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.142.

86. Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp.2-3; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, pp.131, 142; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.52.

87. See Manning and Rumbiak, *op. cit.*, pp.26, 56 and Tom Hyland, 'From crowded Java to the promised land', *Canberra Times*, 24 September 1989, p.24. The precise number of government-sponsored and unassisted or spontaneous transmigrants in Irian Jaya is difficult to specify. Tapol Bulletin, 86, 1988, p.17, states nearly 140,000 transmigrants had been brought to the province by the end of the 1970s; Arndt (quoting Hastings) in R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.170, states that 160,000 spontaneous transmigrants had arrived in Irian Jaya by 1983; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.130, states 70,000 sponsored and 160,000 spontaneous transmigrants had arrived by 1984; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.141, mentions 60,000 sponsored and 160,000 spontaneous transmigrants; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.181, gives figures of 100,000 government-sponsored and 180,000 unassisted transmigrants in 1988.

88. Arndt in R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.170; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.141; Tapol, *op. cit.*, p.56; Garnaut and Manning, *op. cit.*, p.37; See also David Jenkins, 'The us and them world of Irian Jaya', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 December 1985, p.31.

89. Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.181.

90. Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.180; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.143.

91. Department of Home Affairs, *Development in Irian Jaya*, Jakarta, July 1985, p.2.

92. E. Soewandha Natanegara, *Api Perjuangan Pembebasan Irian Barat*, (The Struggle for the Freedom of West Irian), Yayasan Badan Kontak Keluarga Besar Perintis Irian Barat, Jakarta, 1986, pp.402, 437, 460.

93. Manning and Rumbiak, *op. cit.*, pp.8-11, 75; Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, pp.139-40; 'More new roads to be built in Irian Jaya', *Jakarta Post*, 27 December 1986.

94. Chris Manning, 'Irian Jaya's migrants gain economic clout', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 April 1987, pp.41, 43; Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.27-8.

95. Garnaut and Manning, *op. cit.*, p.81.

96. Chris Manning, 'Irian Jaya's migrants gain economic clout', *op. cit.*, p.40.

97. Daniel Ajamiseba, 'Primary Education in Irian Jaya', *Irian:*



*Bulletin of Irian Jaya*, XV, 1987, p.6, states 'only 50 per cent of school-age children attend primary schools in this province'. Hastings noted that '60 per cent of Irianese school-age children are still not reached by the government education or health care systems'. See Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.142.

98. Ajamiseba, *op. cit.*, pp.6-7.

99. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 13 July 1990, p.1X.

100. *ibid.*, 5 July 1989, p.X.

101. *ibid.*, 6 September 1990, p.1X.

102. 'Memprihatinkan, kesehatan masyarakat Irja', (Health of Irianese people causes concern), *ibid.*, 6 September 1990, p.1X.

103. 'Banyak Puskesmas pembantu di Irja tidak berfungsi' (Many village health centres in Irian Jaya do not function), *ibid.*, 18 September 1990, p.X.

104. *ibid.*, 18 September 1990, p.X.

105. Lagerberg, *op. cit.*, p.113; Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.2.

106. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.11; Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.81-3.

107. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.137, estimates '700 to 1,000 members, which include dependents and sympathisers'; Ralph Premdas in *Kabar Seberang*, 15, 1985, p.66, states 'most reliable sources accept an estimate of 400-600 hard core guerillas with an extensive network of floating recruits'. A Department of Defence submission in 1989 to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade stated 'The OPM has no more than several hundred hard-core activists fighting in the jungle. In strictly military terms, the OPM is weak, poorly armed and trained. It has only limited firearms and is reliant on traditional weapons'. (See 'Australia's Relations with Papua New Guinea', official Hansard report, vol 1, p.S104.) Jacob Prai, an OPM leader, stated in 1981 that the movement had 'seven regional commands...(each with) anything between a thousand and several thousand trained troops'; in 1982, OPM leader Seth Rumkorem said that '30,000 Papuans were active throughout the country' (Tapol, *op. cit.*, pp.98, 100; R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.61). More recently, James Nyaro claimed he commanded up to 35,000 guerrillas (Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.96). Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.184, noted the difficulty of establishing facts from Irianese accounts of events. Hastings in R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.224, makes a similar observation.

108. Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.182.

109. Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.181, and Monbiot, *op. cit.*, pp.203-4, note that many Irianese fear the OPM.

110. Hastings in Lim Joo-Jock, *op. cit.*, p.137.

111. Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.18.



112. The Free Aceh Movement has a strong Islamic basis but the underlying reasons that gave rise to its birth and sustained its existence are similar to those in Irian Jaya: a perception that the development of Aceh had been neglected; employment practices that discriminated against Acehnese; and the inflow of foreign socio-political values based on the government's 'assimilation' strategy. See Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, 'Issues and politics of regionalism in Indonesia: Evaluating the Acehnese experience', Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds), *op. cit.*, pp.124-6.

113. Ralph Premdas, 'The Organisasi Papua Merdeka in Irian Jaya', *Asian Survey*, XXV, 10, October 1985, p.1062; Suriadireja, 'Problems in Irian Jaya', pp.8-9; Monbiot, *op. cit.*, p.183.

114. van der Kroef, *op. cit.*, p.152. In the same vein, the Free Aceh Movement is depicted as a criminal and not a political organisation. According to military spokesmen, the Free Aceh Movement is made up of criminals, military deserters, and marijuana growers resentful over a military drug eradication program. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 October 1990, p.22 and 24 January 1991, p.21; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 December 1990, p.9; and *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 12 July 1990, pp.1, X.

115. General Sutrisno as reported in *Indonesian Observer*, 4 October 1990, p.1.

116. *Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan* (GPK). See *Indonesian Observer*, 3 August 1990, p.1. This terminology has replaced the initials GPL which stood for 'wild terrorist gangs' (See Tapol, *op. cit.*, p.25).

117. Department of Information, *OPM: Aftermath of Colonialism*, Jakarta, September 1976, p.15.

118. *ibid.*, p.7; Lagerberg, *op. cit.*, p.13; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.32.

119. Brian May, *op. cit.*, p.196.

120. Department of Information, *OPM, Aftermath of Colonialism*, p.15. Similarly, the size of, and popular support for, the Free Aceh Movement is probably understated. The governor of Aceh said in 1990 that 'there are only around 36 of the criminals left...' See *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 12 July 1990, p.1.

121. Sharp, *op. cit.*, p.6; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p.160; Lagerberg, *op. cit.*, pp.7, 113.

122. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 1 December 1990, p.V11. Similarly, the governor of Aceh (commenting on the security situation in the wake of the Free Aceh Movement rebellion) said: 'History proves that development is impossible to effect without a stable security situation. With instability, prosperity shrinks to the rear, while misery and suffering move to the fore.' Governor Ibrahim Hasan, *ibid.*, 12 July 1990, p.1X.

123. *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, 23 October 1990, p.V11;

Tapol Bulletin No. 102, December 1990, p.6.

124. Suriadireja, 'Problems in Irian Jaya', *op. cit.*, p.9.  
Italics added.

#### 4. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

As noted in chapter 1, Indonesia will not allow Irian Jaya to become independent. To do so would be to invite the disintegration of the Republic.<sup>1</sup> Realistically, the best that can be hoped for is a realisation on the part of the national and provincial authorities that the scope and pace of development programs in Irian Jaya should take greater account of the wishes of the Irianese people. Further, security incidents should be seen by the military as a manifestation of dissatisfaction with government policy and the implementation of policy. If more attention was given to resolving the underlying causes of dissatisfaction rather than to heavy-handed retribution, the likelihood of prolonged dissatisfaction in the province would be lessened considerably.

Warnings on the negative aspects of development programs are clear enough. In 1983, for example, the then Kodam commander advised the government to reduce transmigration because it had made the Irianese 'feel like strangers in their own land'.<sup>2</sup> Transmigration has since slowed considerably, but this is probably due more to the low soil fertility, lack of suitable sites, and the high cost of the program<sup>3</sup> than to a desire to take account of the sensitivities of the Irianese people. Another former commander warned against encouraging Irianese to eat rice



and the danger of immigrants from Makasar (Sulawesi) establishing economic and trade monopolies.<sup>4</sup> He noted that the lack of employment and educational opportunities for the indigenous Irianese, together with their treatment as second-class citizens, were contributing factors to public support for the OPM.<sup>5</sup> Provincial development reports make the point that the Irianese people should be given more say in the formulation and implementation of development programs.<sup>6</sup> Until the aspirations of the Irianese are given full attention, many of the indigenous inhabitants of Irian Jaya will remain reluctant to accept the authority of the Indonesian government.

The powerful influence of the media, the widespread use of the Indonesian language<sup>7</sup> and the strong ideological focus in education are all reasons for the gradual but coerced integration of the province into the larger Indonesian society. On the other hand, the arrival of large numbers of migrants from outside the province, the alienation of traditional land, the harshness of the military, the treatment of the Irianese as culturally backward and efforts to effect a cultural transformation provide reasons for the continuance of dissatisfaction.

The military's support for development programs is a further reason for continued dissatisfaction. For the military, development has both a physical and a mental dimension. It encompasses not only economic measures to improve the welfare of the people, but also cultural assimilation, transmigration and programs to develop an awareness of Indonesia's national philosophy and system of total people's defence. Some of these

programs are the root cause of the dissatisfaction. Nonetheless, they are likely to be supported vigorously by the military because development is perceived to be the remedy for security problems and lack of development the cause of the problems.<sup>8</sup> In the absence of a dramatic change to the military's role in social and political affairs, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the dissatisfaction of many Irianese with the Indonesian system will continue for some time yet.

On a broader level, the dissatisfaction of many Irianese with government policies will continue to have an irritating effect on regional security and international relations. Dissident activity in Irian Jaya periodically spills over the border through the use by OPM separatists of Papua New Guinea as a safe haven, the pursuit of rebels across the border by Indonesian troops, and the crossing of Irianese into Papua New Guinea to seek refuge. From the Indonesian perspective, the Papua New Guinea government was considered to have tacitly sympathised with the OPM cause<sup>9</sup> and to be half-hearted in fulfilling its agreement not to allow its territory to be used for hostile acts against Indonesia.<sup>10</sup> Despite successful efforts by both governments to increase communication, cooperation and mutual understanding over the past years,<sup>11</sup> continued dissatisfaction in Irian Jaya is likely to give rise to occasional tension between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea which, inevitably, will have a negative effect on the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

## Notes to Chapter 4:

1. R.J. May (ed.), *Between Two Nations*, Robert Brown and Associates, Bathurst, 1986, p.69.
2. David Jenkins, 'The trickle that threatens to become a flood', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 December 1985, p.12. Cautionary voices were heard well before this. See George Aditjondro, 'Marthin Indey, Pilar Perjuangan Pembesan Irian Barat di Jayapura', (Marthin Indey: A Pillar of Support in Jayapura of West Irian's Struggle for Freedom), *Prisma*, 2, 1987, p.126.
3. Arndt in R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.172; George Monbiot, *Poisoned Arrows*, Michael Joseph, London, 1989, pp.38-9; Lavalin International and Hasfarm Dian Konsultan, *Regional Development Planning for Irian Jaya*, September 1988, pp.20, 28.
4. Kahpi Suriadireja, 'Pengembangan Irian Jaya ditinjau dari segi ketahanan nasional', (Development in Irian Jaya from the viewpoint of national resilience), Manuel Kasiepo et al. (eds), *Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedalaman Irian Jaya*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1987, pp.54, 58.
5. *ibid.*, pp.54, 64.
6. Lavalin International, *op. cit.*, pp.20, 28.
7. Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning, *Irian Jaya: The Transformation of a Melanesian Economy*, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, p.91.
8. E.P. Wolfers, *Beyond the Border*, UPNG and USP, Waigani and Suva, 1988, p.89.
9. Nonie Sharp, *The Rule of the Sword: The Story of West Irian*, Kibble Books, Malmsbury, pp.50-4, 59; R.J. May, *op. cit.*, p.105.
10. Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Republic of Indonesia, 27 October 1986, Article 9.
11. See, for example, *Post Courier*, Port Moresby, 11 December 1990, p.2 and 13 December 1990, p.2; *Harian Umum Angkatan Bersenjata*, (Armed Forces Daily), 4 August 1990, p.1, 3 September 1990, p.V1, 4 October 1990, p.V11 and 13 December 1990, p.1; *Indonesian Observer*, 24 July 1990, p.1, and 28 July 1990, p.1; and *Indonesia Times*, 28 September 1990, p.3.



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